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TH^ /CEipSIS OP-A NOVEL PLAN :
During the intep*war period a series of attempta were 
. made by European statesmen to establish peace, and stability. 
Among these attempts, the Locarno Agreements of 1925 and the 
Munich Pact of 1938 have been the subject òf continued his­
torical discussion. The EOur-Power Pact of 1933 has gener­
ally been ignored because it never fully came into effect 
and consequently did not leave an impact on the course of 
Internatione! relations•
But the Four-Power Pact represents a unique diplomatic 
development during the internar period, it can be regarded 
as forming the logical link between Locarno and Munich.
More important, however^ is the fact that it represent3 .an 
attempt to reyive thè historical "Concert of.Europe" in 
order to solve European problems.
The Pour-Power Pact was proposed by Benito Mussolini.
As such it was designed, as a measure to promote the interests 
Of Italy. But Vt^ jh€K.;.ti'mò■■'it.‘ was proposed it was evident 
that conditions in Europe had worsened to a point where such 








respect the pact Came to be regarded as a significant Ital­
ian contribution to the process of European conciliation. At 
any rate spch was ^hé;impression that prevailed in Britain 
and Italy at the time* The British anhassadó^ fh Koine> Sir 
Ronald Graham, wrote?
The idea of a »political truce * has been vaguely 
under ^iacuàsioh' in Europe for some years past ¿" i iiòth- 
togjpractical; however, had ever taken definite'shape, 
although the idèa .remained below the!surface of the 
minds of certain statesmen inEhn?ope^^ Of ;these : ; 
statesmen Signor Mus solini was one , and .it \i s Inter­
esting. to; recall that in his speech at Turin on the 
23rd -October* 1932* he mentioned the idea of collab­
oration between the Pour Great Western Powers * . *
»But I think: that if tomorrow* on the basis'of ,1us- 
’ tice, on the basis of the recognition' of our sacred 
rights , » . the ground could be prepared so as to 
permit óf collaboration between the four Great West­
ern Powers* Europe could be tranquil from the 'polit- 
: ical, ppint of .vvi'ewi . and perhaps ; the, economici-crisis • 
which grips: ua might - move towards its end*♦ 1t.
The need for U »political truce * became acute in March 
of 1933V, The League of Nations, created at, Versailles in 
I9I9 to serve as an instrument for internat1 onal cooperation 
and stability, had been rendered useless* France and her 
allies had dominated it and used it as a tool to promote 
their statusrqUO- policies. The status-quo had now become 
untenable, The- economic crisis had generated a wave of mil­
itant nationalism in various countries which encouraged
^E* L, Woodward and Rohan Butler (ad,)» Documents on 
British Foreign Policy, 1919-39» Second /Series, Vol* V, 
(LòndQn,l9^6),; 35S-i>9,
aggression# In Germany the Nazis took power at the end of 
January1933*  : Their gospel had been preached in black and 
white; the international system established at Versailles 
j ' was now threatened by Its most serious antagonist^ The Pis* 
V, • armament Conference,, which opened In Geneva in February 
1932# proved to be a prolonged farce# Prance consistently 
refused to sacrifice the advantage accruing from German pros- 
; tration# Germany now threatened to rearm at all costs* 
k , The first step to alleviate the worsening Enropean sit­
uation was talien fey Britain# Her policy favored a success* 
ful conclusion of the Disarmament Conference as the best 
means of assuring security in Europe, Britain felt that the 
situation at Geneva in March 1933 was hopeless# Consequently* 
Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Foreign Secretary Sir 
John Simon paid a visit to Geneva* Their immediate aim was
'Winston S, Churchill# While England
28, Churchill made an apt analysis, when he declared# 
"The expectation Of a general disarmament upon a great scale 
has failed} the hope of one nation being able to disarm its 
rival has been frustrated by the very Stout and stubborn 
resistance which hvery nation makes to that process « Now
* . , a large part of the object of everyf country is to throw 
the blame for an impending failure {of the 
ference) upon sòme other.country#0
"# . * since the-WarLoearno wasthe 
Europe# Look what a distance we have fa!
Fears are greater# rivalries are 
plans are more closely concerted*0 , Since 
statement on November 23# 1932* the rise 
contributed to the further worsening’ of
S Pi sarmament Con-
high-water mark of 
len since then * ♦ * 
sharper * military 
Churchill pad® this 
of Hitler.in■Germany 
European relations.
kto reanimate the dying Disarmament Conference. On March 16* 
the MacDonald Disarmament, flan was presented in Geneva* 
MacDonald appealed to the delegates to consider it in a 
spirit of mutual conees.sion;. At the same time the British . 
ministers established personal contact with representatives 
of the other netionsi in Geneva* Approaches were made to 
Rome expressing' the British desire to confer with the Ital- . 
ian government. It was felt that Mussolini could bring use­
ful influence to bear ón Hitler and thereby restrain the 
. .revolutionary zeal of the New Germany*3.
Britain also encouraged thè organization of "Mutual 
Assistance", in BUrópé as a means of encouraging European 
conçiliatiô.ni^ On March 17i MacDonald exprès sed to a group
^Regarding British anxiety to fescue thè,Disarmament Con­
ference from.failure see Documents on British Foreign Policy* 
1919439» 2, V* 68, 72 5 Vo^ L* W *  Ìj67V and Documents on
German Foreign Policy, Ì9l8^n5« Ser. C* (1933-1937) The Third 
Reich: First Phase * Voi. I*'January 30-Óctobef In* 1933 
(Washington, D, C., 1957)*. l6l* 166,
^Britain encouraged the adoption by the Disarmament Con­
ference of a Pact of Mutual Assistance* especially in the 
Five-Power Declaration of December 11, 1932, and the declar­
ation of "no resort to force" of February lit^  1933? see Doc­
uments on British.Foreign Policy. 1919439. 2* IV {1932-1933), 
(London* 1950 )V 377» League of Nations. Records of the Con­
ference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Ser* D, 
(Geneva, 1936)* "■ ' " "
of journalIats his hope3 of discussing the formation of "The
Peace Club” with Mussolini»„5 He pò int e d. out that his pur *
pose in visiting Rome was "to ask Mussolini whether he does 
not also believe that Europe is in serious danger, and
whether he does not believe that we should cooperate in 
order to ward off this danger ».nv •
The conduct of British policy suggests that Britain was 
already in favor of an arrangement of the kind that Musso- , 
lini proposed on March 18* Ah editorial comment in a London 
newspaper, points this out clearly: "MrMacDonald is gen­
erally ¡.understood to have quite definite ideas of his own
about the restoration of better feeling in Ehirope* It is 
accordingly assumed that the project suggested by Signor 
Mussolini proved in fact to be in general harmony with the 
ideas of Mr» MacDonald*”7
The proposals presented to MacDonald on March 18 by the 
Itairan Government; representedi» in a sense* a continuation
^lohn Wi Wheeler-Bennett* The Pipe Dream, of Peace (New
York, 19.35)* 129.:
^Documents on . German Foreign Policya 19Í6¿lt5, jC»^j;» 198»
?The Tiroes (London)» March 18, 1933* PA 12» The idea of 
fóur-Powèr collaboration•was emphasized in the British Disi 
armament Plan of March 16; see Wheeler-Bennet1» The Pipe 
Dream of Peace, 2Ó7»
6of the policies the British Prime Minister had been advocate 
ing. Only a statesman of Mussolini’s shrewdness could have 
created an ingenious plan which, while giving the impression 
of a measure for solving International problems, was designed 
to promote the interests of Italy* to advance the fascist 
policy of * sacre d egoism.?
The Mussolini plan proposed that the four Great Powers 
should establish themselves as a European •directory* and as 
guardians of peace* Other countries were to be compelled to 
follow the foUr^Power lead* The forum Of the Great Powers 
was to decide the, issue of treaty revision as well as that 
of granting "equality of rights" to Germany, Austria, Hungary 
and Bulgaria* These were indeed unprecedented proposals:
March ij., 1933
. '■ 'v"VV'' ' "Ì '-'Z- 'i '
The four Western Powers, France, Germany, Great 
Britain and Italy, undertake'to establish between • 
themselves an effective policy of collaboration with 
a view to the-maintenance' of peace in accordance with 
the spirit Of' the".ICellogg Pact and the "No Force 
Pact," and undertake to follow, in the European 
sphere, such a line of action as will induce third 
parties, if necessary, to adopt such a policy of 
peace. '• "v- ■ W/ •
• 2
The four Powers reaffirm in accordance with the 
articles of the Covenant of the League of. Nations, 
the principle of the Revision of the treaties of 
peace in circumstances capable of producing a con­
flict between nations s but they declaré that such a
1... -. • V  V . - 7
principie óf rèvisión can only be applied within the 
. framework of the. League of Nations and through mutual 
récognition of the common nature, of the. interests 
■ involved.'. ;,v:;
■■'V "■ i ' 3
France, Great Britain and Italy declare thatj 
Should the Disarmament Conference only produce par­
tial results, the equality of rights which has been 
granted to Germany must have a praotical:applicationj 
and Germany undertakes to achieve such equality of 
rights gradually as a result of successive .agree-, 
ffibnts to' be arrived at by the four Powers through 
the normal diplomatic channelsé
The four Powers undertake to arrive at similar 
agreements in regard to 'equality1 for Austria* ,
Hungary and- Bulgaria*. ■ ?
■■■ ■ ; . '  ; : ■ ”
In all political and non^political questions* 
whether European* non«rEuropean or relating to the 
Colonial sphere, the four Powers undertake to adopt 
as far as possible a common line of action.
■ . S
The present political agreement for mutual 
understanding and co~pperation will be presented* 
where, necessary* to the respective- Parliaments for 
approval within three months* will be valid for ten 
. years, . * . .'•
. • - 6 ■ ' ■
The present- pact will be registered at the Sec­
retariat of the League of Nations.® .
^Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919-39, 2* V, 67* 
Translations of the Italian draft are also contained in: 
Documents, on German Foreign Policy, 19L9*»1i5* C» I* 162} and 
Foreign Relations of the. United States* Diplomatic Papers, 
1933* I* (Washington, D. C .* I950)* ij.01* -
In a speech to the Italian Senate on June 7, 1933, 
Mussolini attempted to portray himself? as a "good European," 
a mari of peace who was moved to making his proposals in the 
interests of the Disarmament Conference and thé European 
situation in general.; He declared:
The idea of a pact of Collaboration and ütlden* ' 
standing between four Western Powers took shape in 
my mind after the conclusionr-a more or less nega* 
tlve conclusion--of the first phase of the Disarma­
ment Conférence last summer. In October I hinted 
at it in Turin . .. # % The idea appeared to me to 
be of still more urgent interest at the beginning of 
March, when the panorama of European politics seemed 
more gloomy for a variety of reasons, not the least . 
of which W s  the lack of progress achieved in the 
second phase of the Disarmament Conference « Such/is 
what I call-the personal genesis of my proposal .
What ;I will call the objective genesis of the 
pact is different * > * is intended to consti­
tute a continuation and development of, those inter* 
national pacts*-flrst and foremost that of Locarno-« 
which arc an expression of the spirit Of understand­
ing and collaboration between states, to the exclusion 
of any idea of rival groupings or of rigid political 
ântagonismàiP ; 'V .....
Mussolini exploited fully his professions ; of woj?kihg ih 
the interests of peace * To the British he emphasized the 
idea of à ten-ryear pacification contained in his proposals, 
as well as the desire to resolve the disarmament stalemate, 
and restore the »Locarno Spirit.» To the Germans he empha­
sized that in France war with Germany "was. not only considered 9
9 John W. yJheeler ^Bennett,.' (ed.), Documents on Interna­
tional Affairs, 1933» (Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London, 193u) 267».
^Documents oh British Foreign Policy, 1919-39» 2, V, 71»
possible but most menacingly close at hand," and that "in 
view of this threatening world situation the Mhssolihi pact 
acquired very special significance. : This pact really repre*  
sented the last appeal to the reason of Europe ¿ To the 
French he declared that one of the "chief objects of the 
Four-Power Pact was that it should form the basis for sub­
sequent Franco-Italian negotiations," with a view to solving
.......' fo .
the questions ' outstanding between thé two . countries.
Thé Fqur^Power Pact proposals essentially represented a 
continuation of the Italian attempt to end the position of 
inferiority assigned to Italy at Versailles• At Locarno* for 
the first time since the war* Italy had been called upon to 
maintain the European balance in cooperation with Britain.
Her position as a great power had been recognized and her 
national ego immensely boosted'«^ But the situation had since
il - •••."_ ■ - - . - .
Documents on. German Foreign Policy¿ I91$*1í5» G, I, 205»
l^Docüménts on, British Foreign Follow 1919*39» ?» V,; I4.0I4.; 
and Wheeler-Bennett (ed*), Documents on International Affairs, 
1933» ?7!h  ' ‘ : 1
*3-Dino Grand!* "The Foreign Policy of the Duce*" Foreign 
Affairs. (New York) ¿ XII < ( July* 193ÜJ » 553*66. The writer 
points out that in the recognition of Italy's position as a. 
great power in the' Locarno Agreements ánd the Four-Power Pact* 
"consists the deepest and more real significance of the Duce's 
foreign policy,"
10
changed and Italy’s Importance had diminished* whLleyFrehOh
• .• ¿jl
predominance in Europe continued unchecked * - Thus, "in the
. destruction of the power balance in Europe* Italian policy 
had been robbed of its most effective l e v e r * J o z e f  Beck 
; correctly explains* "Italy* as a state which was the last in 
••V Europe to reach for the status of so-called great Power* had 
¿v the passion'of an Upstart for the■revival of•'the "Balance of 
Power” so characteristic of the European politics' Of the 
nineteenth century * ’
It was to recreate the balance of power In Europe that 
Mussolini wanted to revive the spirit of Locarno*< In his 
June 7 speech.Mussolini conceded as much when he said: *1
•^-Mussolini resented French hegemony in Europe, which was 
represented by her satellite system and her domination of 
the League of Nations : ”1 regard the network of treaties of
friendship * s * as greater guarantees of peace than alli­
ances on the grand scàié and even than the League of Hations*” 
quoted, in Emil Ludwig* Talks with Mussolini, (London* 1932)* 
IÍ4I4.* Mussolihi was . irritated when* in February l933*the 
Little Entente adopted,a Pact of Organization* thereby form* 
ing a "Fifth Great Power” in Europe» The Germán Foreign 
Minister pointedout* "With his proposal Mussolini is undôübfc- 
édly pursuing the secondary aim of weakening France *;s‘ hegem­
ony and upsetting her system of alliances* In a certain sense
1 .. *. it is to bè considered as a counteraction against the 
new alliance = of the Little Entente *.”**Docufeents on German 
Foreign PollcVi Í9l84t5* 0» I. 225*
^Albrecht-Garrí e* Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New 
■•York* 1950)* 1^9*
^Colonel Józef Beck, Final Report (Hew York* 1957)» 35*
reason of their situation and 
factors which characterise them, 
are called>;to> maintain a balance in 
owing to this that the Locarno Pact 
à special function, And this balance 





finds in the 
new possibil­
ity of. fruitful and. Constructive development»j1* '
Mussolini's intention in proposing the organization of a
•Concert * of four, powers vías to create for Italy the rol© of
an honest broker between Germany and France< The rise of 
Germany Was indéed favorable to Italy, for in that lay the 
possibility Of support in her revisioniStic àspiràtióhs by 
the greatest, of the revisionist powers, ° The establishment 
of a directorate of the four great powers on the basis of 
equality,, while transfering- business from the League to the 
four power group would enhance the importance of Italy 
whose support would be courted by both Germany and France--
for a price,. At the same timé such a directory, while re- 
dueing the hegemony of France, would also tend- to restrain
' ' - ■ •••
'Wheeler-Bennett (ed,), Documents on International 
Affairs, 1913* 273. .* ■ ■ ■
■^The German ambassador in Rome, Ulrich von Hassell,, wrote 
that the Mussolini plan was designed to "preserve intact”
”thé strong trump Card that Italy was dealt by the victory of 
the Hitler movement,”-¿Documents on; German Foreign Policy, 
Ì918-Ì-Ì4.5# C, I, 18l.f Ample evidence is a vai fable regarding 
Mussolini's revisiOnistic aëpirationsî see Documents on 
British Foreign Policy, 1919*39» 2, V, 735 Maxwell H.~~H, 
Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy*3 Foreign and Colonial Pol­
icy (London, 1 9 3 8 ) 123J, Luigl ViIlari, Italian Foreign"’Poli­
cy under Mu3solini (Hew York, 1956), 78; and Barone Bernardo 
Quaranta di San Severino,: (ed,, tran, , ) ¿ Mussolini» As 
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the »New Germany.» Toynbee makes ah appropriate analysis
Of the Italian strategy: "Italy had no more: desire to. con*
fer the hegemony of Earope upon Germany than she had to .
concede it to France, since-the fundamental policy of Italy,
like that of the United-Kingdom, was to prevent any single






^German officials expressed the view that Italian policy 
"will be willing to take.account of wishes which may be 
. . expressed by the. German side only to the extent that these 
accord with the Italian p o l i c y S e e  Documents oh German 
■y. Foreign Policy, 19i8*ii5i C, i> S7k n*. I* /
. Arnold J» Toynbpe (ed.), Survey of International Affairs. 
1933, (Royal institute of International Affairs, London,
193$) | 200..
CHAPTER II
EUROPE AND THE MUSSOLINI PLAN
Thé Mussolini plan projected into the international 
arena bold new proposals for solving the complex European 
problems* The formal recognition of revision of treaties 
and a positive acceptance of German equality represented 
grave new factors that were bound to have serious repercus­
sions in EhrôpèV . In’ the midst of such international reac­
tions the Pact negotiations required careful handling.
Mussolini developed a strategy that speaks well for his 
political foresight . .
Italian policy encouraged the development of a close 
bond between Germany and I t a l y B u t  In order to exercise 
restraint on' Germany Mussolini attempted to negotiate the 
entire pact with Germany on a secret basis. On many occa­
sions he adopted the expedient of telephone conversations 
with Hitler. German objections to the draft pact, consequently 
never, became public, and the unsalutary influence they were 
bound to have in France was thus avoided.
The Four-Power Pact" proposals contained the novel polit­
ical idea of reviving the Concert of Europe. ; Britain* France* 
Germany and Italy were to form a 'directory* in order to
' ■ !Ò; ■ 
£'■■■
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exercise influence on general European policy* This repre­
sented a contradiction of the French system of security* It 
was obvious that France and her allies would be perturbed by 
the pact proposals* Mussolini must have been conscious of 
this When he adopted the strategy of first winning Britain 
over to his proposals * British influence in Paris would 
thereby ensure favorable consideration of the proposals by 
France* The nature of British foreign policy at this time 
represented'a striking similarity with the Italian policy of 
furthering the cause of peace* And by emphasising the peace 
aspect of his proposals Mussolini hoped to lure Britain into 
accepting a position of leadership in the pact negotiations* 
At the same time by maintaining Italy’s crucial role In the 
negotiations Germany could be reassured*
A rather paradoxical strategy was adopted by Italy* On 
the one handf. in secret conversations Mussolini created the
impression in Berlin that his proposals essentially repre­
sented an Italo-German plot designed to further the cause of 
fascism* Qn the Other hand* Italian proposals were advertised 
aà an Anglo*Italian effort toward assisting the task of estab­
lishing peace in Europe♦ A two-faced diplomacy of this nature 
required careful handling and Mussolini betook himself to the 
task with the ingenuity of a masterful diplomat.
Oil March lJi|/ 1933 thè Italian ambassador in Berlin* 
Vittorio Cerruti* called on the German Foreign Minister* Baron
von Neurath* and expressed Mussolini’s concern at thè deter­
ioration of the European political situation* He declared 
that thè situation in the disarmament conference at Geneva 
”was completely hopeless;" and. that in Prance* Poland and the 
Littlé Entente countries the military circles were strongly 
contemplating a preventive war against Italy and Germany» At 
the' same tIme’*, thè ambassador explained* public opinion in 
these countries, as well as; all over Europe* was i n ’favor of 
preserving peace* • Mussolini was anxious that these aspira­
tions for peace should be realized. British Prime Minister 
MacDonald was similarly inclined. A meeting between the two 
leaders was planned in order that the draft pact be presented 
to Britain and her acceptance thereof secured* Such a. devel­
opment would help bring about a ’’considerable detente in i 
Europe, .  .
The Italian draft was presented in Berlin On March ill 
"for an immediate expression of German view»” After that 
Italy planned to present the draft to Britain* and with her 
assistance to encourage a favorable reaction ,to the proposals 
in France:» Mussolini emphasized that Italy was interested in 
obtaining German concurrence before presenting the draft to 
the other countries. *2
^Documents ¡on German Foreign Policy* 19lQ-li5» C* I ♦ For 
a record of theHTerruti^Neurath Conference on March 111 see 
P» l60 <-62.
2Ibid*. 160*62*
It 'was also suggested that both Italy and Germany should 
avoid; giving the Impression of a close friendship between
them.till after the pact had- been signed, 'Plans for a meet­
ing b'etween; Hitler- and Muss,dlinl should consequently he left 
in abeyance. 'Once the pact was signed a h  expression of Italo-
Qerman friendship would not arouse.extreme excitement in
Prancei'' As Cerrut/l put it: ’Once the agreement JjL&J eon-
eluded, all'these disturbing elements would vanish and Musso­
lini would be very glad towelcome the Chancellor in Home or.
; „V ■ ■ • ' ' > " •
elsewhere,. ;
Continuing.his strategy of. presenting Italy as a friend 
of 'C^rmâhyy- 'Màsâoii'hi..'tqid the German ambassador in Rome, 
Ulrich yon Hassell', that if the pact was' concluded it woùld 
ensure, a five-year or ten-year period of tranquility, there- • 
by giving time for thé consolidation of the hew' regime in 
Germany... At the same timé, Germany would be able to rearm 
on the basis of "equality of rights" while loanee would bp 
deprived of any pretext for taking action against her.
Mussolini -.also' pointed out that the recognition of the 
possibility .of treaty, ipevision would be a moral . victory for 
Germany,. Hungary, Aüstriá and Bulgaria:. "The system of the 
peace treaties (would). thereby (be) practically finished."^




for a record, of Mussolini ,:s conversations with 
see p. IÔ6-67.
Such a phrase was b ound to appeal to Hitler as he waS pledged 
to tear down the!, provisions of the "diktat" of Versaillesi
In an . prepared by the.German Foreign Office
on March 15 and duly approved by Hitler Germany formally 
expressed her acceptance of the Italian proposals. At the 
same time she expressed doubts about article I of the pact 
whereby the' four Western Powers were to constitute themselves 
as leaders of European policy# declaring that it was a "sharp 
attack against the French system of alliances^ especially 
against Poland and the recently consolidated little Entente*
It is mòre than doubtful whether France will accept this *
Germany also expressed her objection to the idea of con­
ducting tréaty revision through the League of Nations as 
envisaged by article II of the draft pact* She favored a 
stronger article II with lèsa emphasis on the rôle of the 
League of Nations: "Since the provisions of the League of
Nations Covenant with regard to the revision of the treaty 
are* as we know, entirely inadequate* this part Of Section II 
would have to he amended,
As regards article III of the Mussolini plan, Germany 
expressed "special satisfaction" with the idea that her equal­
ity of status must be given immediate practical application. *6
^Documents on German Foreign Policy, I918-I4.5 * 0$..1$. I68*
6Ibid,i I68-69*
She insisted, however, that she would be to .aësert
her equality "by stages" decided among' the four Powers only 
for the period of five years and not ten years*
Italy made no direct^reply to these initial German con* 
si derat ions« On March 17 ambassador Cerruti called, on the 
Foreign Office in .Berlin, and gave: assurances that Mussolini 
would 'keep German Objections in mind* He suggested that Ger­
many should not feel perturbed about the references to the 
League of Nations or ' to: rearmament "by degrees, 11 as thè basic 
idea was that "the four Powers were to combine to shape Euro­
pean policy," and Germany could always depend on Italian sup­
port in this fOUr-Power forum.^
German reactions to the Italian proposals varied betwéeh 
satisfaction and fear« Thé idea of four-Power collaboration, .
which was being raised' for thè first time since the war in a 
formal manner, as well as the formal"recognition of treaty 
revision and the acceptance of German equality, were very 
encouraging factors fop .Germany* Indeed, there was the sat­
isfying feeling that an unprecedented moral victory might bë 
achieved without the use of force* At the same time, there 
was the fear of the pact, "already very meager in content, 
being watered down in the course of the negotiations. Not 
only the sense of thè, whole undertaking could be lost thereby,
^Documents on German Foreign Policy, 19l8-k5, C, I, 
record of 'this conf erence" p* 17 7•
but it might Oven result in certain circumstance s, in: a deter«» 
ioration of /jSermân/ position. • Especially, if Mussolini 
; -wore..’to'make' concessions to Britain and France , Germany*s
opposition might tend to isolate her. There was also the 
fear that the pact might encourage a FrancO^Itallan rapproche­
ment;* vihich would work to Germany’s disadvantage! ;
/M©anvd^.la>. Mussolini was preparing to launch the. second 
step.in hia strategy* Oh March 15*..following an enquiry by 
the British ambassador# Sir Ronald Graham, Mussolini had
•gladly agreed to.invite British Prime Minister MacDonald to 
visit Rome;^ An official visit •, was accordingly arranged for 
March 18-20*
MacDonald arrived in Geneva on March 16 i n .an-effort to
improve the prospects of peace in Europei Before- leaving for 
Rome he held discussions in Geneva with’ t h è French Prime Min­
ister* Edouard Paladier* MacDonald’s idea of organising a 
Peace Club in Europe received Considerable French support*
and Daladier expressed his approval of the British mission to
TO *■ ! '
Romei • The desire to meet with Mussolini indicates British *10
^Documents On Germani Foreign Policy* 19l8tlin5tf C*. I§ 200«-02*
10Inf orination regarding Anglo-French conversations is found 
in Toynbee (efl).;Survey of International Affairs, r1933», 212j 
^Vheeler-Bennett»"''The* Plpe Dream of Peace (Hew York*. 1935) * 129•
interest In Mussolini’s ideas regarding the. of
tranquility';inr Europe;^ '
MacDonald, accompanied by his Foreign Secretary* Sir
John.Simon, arrived in Italy on March 18« Mussolini appeared 
in person at the. air-port of Ostia to greet them:* And to 
emphasize Italian' hospitality, the British Ministera were
taken to.Rome in a car driven by Mussolini. This marked the 
beginning of impresslye ceremony with which. Italy greeted 
the British Prime Minister«**
A copy of the Italian proposals for a four-Power pact of 
collaboration and understanding was presented to MacDonald at 
Ostia**2 The French ambassador in Rome, Henri de Jouvenel,
was also presented with a copy of the Italian proposals on 
the same day. The German ambassador* Von Hassell* Was asked 
by.Mussolini; on March 19 to state that he too had received a 
copy of; the .-'Italian draft on March 18* and that his govern­
ment had accepted the fundamental points contained in it ,*^
**Documents I on British Foreign. Policy,. 19I9«*39, 2, . V, 8ij 
see also Wheeler-Bennettv The Pipe Dream of Peace, 130; and 
Toynbee (ed.)* Survey of International Affairs* 1933, 212.
^Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919*39» 2* V* 81} 
see also Wheeler-Bennett* The Pipe Dream orFeace, I30; and 
Toynbee (ed.), Survey of International Affairs*. 1933» 212.
*^Documents on German Foreign Policy* 1918*1*5» C, I* 18h-85*
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The popular inuression was thus created that the Pour-Power 
Pact was proposed on March 18 and that the British Ministers
, were the first to obtain personal Information about it from
Mussolini* This Italian tactic had the salutary effect of 
encouraging AngiLorItalian cooperation*. ' f
■ Conversations between, the British and the Italian Minis-
ters were held in Rome the following day, March 19 i Musso- 
; lini approached the British with a strategy similar to the 
ÿ one he had already adopted towards Germany-**that of emphasis- 
-, ing those aspects of his controversial plan which he felt 
would best attract them to it «
Mussolini started by pointing out to his British guests 
that his plan envisaged a pacification for ten years* and 
"If the four Great Powers could themselves carry out the pol- 
■ icy of pacificatioh for- Such a period, 'they could well impose 
it upon the smaller P o w e r s . H e  further emphasized that
such pacification would help eliminate from ,thè European 
scene the .idea of opposing Blocs óf Power and thereby remove 
an important source of tension*
There was also.the advantage of allowing Germany to 
obtain ’Gleichberechtig^gV in accordance with article III of 
the proposed pact, which provided that such German equality 
was to be achieved by stages agreed to by the four gréât
Ik
V*. ?1.
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Powers è This would also reassure Prance and satisfy hex’ 
demands- for security* The Disarmament Conference at Geneva 
would,, consequently, be able to make excellent progress* 
Mussolini, assured the' British Ministers t M t  - ”lie had reason 
to believe that Germany would accept an agreement of this 
kind."1^ . ‘ ' . ' . :
Mussolini.pointed out that his plan had a striking resém 
blancé to Locarne, and would tend to revive the »Locarno 
Spirit*» It would therefore become easier to solve the dif­
ficult problem of treaty revision. Mussolini was careful in 
dealing with the question of revision as, raised in article II 
of his plan. He mainly indicated areas such as the Polish 
Corridor, which caused bitterness among European nations and 
endangered peace*: Such areas, Mussolini felt, did not have
strong moral validity, and were not worth irisklng a war, as 
was the case with areas such as Alsace-Lorraine* A revision 
of the peace treaties in. this respect would eliminate a
source, of conflict :/ »»No one had hitherto dared propose the
. - *■ if:V
solution but somebody must come forward*" ■ Mussolini ex­
pressed the belief that treaties are holy but not eternal—
•^ Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919-39. Ser* 2,
V, 71*
16Ibid., 73,
the British Ministers expressed their agreement with this 
view. 17 '
The Anglo-Italian conference agreed that the Mussolini 
plan represented a step forward in the policy recently advo­
cated by MacDonald, and embodied in the Five-Power Declara­
tion of December 11* 1932. And to satisfy further his Brit­
ish guests, Mussolini agreed at their request -to drop the 
colonial question from his draft.
The British Ministers expressed their "great interest" 
in the Italian plan* and offered to cooperate with Italy* 
MacDonald was indeed rather anxious about the whole matter: 
,fThe situation /Ts7 a very difficult one and /callsj for
. T A
early decisions; further delay would be dangerous.'*
The Rome conference decided that French adherence to the 
pact would pose a. problem*; especially If the French press was 
allowed to enlarge upon the pact proposals. Britain assured 
Italy that she would use her good offices with Prance with a 
view to solving ,the problem. It was felt that Daladier was* 
comparatively* a Véry liberal-minded person; hence the possi­
bility that PVance would support the new plan* Also* ambas­
sador de Jouvene.l "was enthusiastic over the proposed
^Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919*39* Ser* p*
V* 7h* 76*77«
l8Ibid.* 70* • .
agreement * andwould be able to exercise useful influence 
in Pària*. - ;
As a first measure to secure their concurrence* or at 
any rate not arouse French suspicions* Britain proposed
Of)
intérim amendments to the Italian draft* Article II was 
amended to contain an emphasis on the sanctity of treaties s
The four Powers confirm that* while the pro­
visions of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
embody, a scruplous respect for all treaty obliga* 
tions è. * * they also contemplate the possibility 
of the revision of thè Treaties of peace * * •'
Article III was also amended to remove the Italian 
assumption that the Disarmament Conference would fail:
The iour Powers reiterate their resolve to co­
opérate in the Disarmament Conference with the other 
States there .represented in seeking, to work out a 
convention whieii shall effect a substantial reduction 
and a limitation of' armaments* with provision for 
future revision with a view to further reduction.
British policy was strongly in favor of ensuring the 
success of the Disarmameht Conference * Sir* John Simón pointed 
this out Clearly at the Borne conference ? "it ¿^§7 important 
that*, whatever arrangement might be reached;by the four 
Powers*,, it should assist the work at Geneva*
20
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The Rom© discussions proved very successful.; The Brit­
ish. Bîinisters were pldesed with th$ Italian proposals* 22 and 
offered to cooperate with Italy* Mussolini was satisfied 
that, his proposals had received' encouraging support from 
Britain.*/. ■ U -
The fate of the. Mussolini, plan now depended, on the atti­
tude France would adopt, toward it ¿ In ■.Paris ;thé.v f irdt reac- 
tion was one of caution and-reserve* A series df hurried 
conferences were' held between' Prime; Minister Daïadiéry For­
eign Minister Paul-Boncour and the chairmen of the Senate and 
Chamber Committees‘oh Foreign Affairs,^ Doubts were expressed 
regarding the establishment of a four-Power •directory* which 
might work to France *s disadvantage* There was also the fear 
of an Italo-German understanding* and of the Italian Inten­
tion to arbitrate between France and Germany in cooperation 
with Britain*23
At the same time French opinion was exceedingly disturbed 
by the course of events in Germany* The parties of the Left* 
led by Daladier* favored an arrangement that would help canal­
ise and control the restless zeal of the Nazis. This would 
also help in containing the parties of the Right* and curb 
the growth of militant nationalism in France* Indeed*
22Pocuments' on British Foreign Policy, 1919*39, 2, V* 103* 
^T h e  Times (London)* March 20, 1933# P* 12*
responsible French politicians favored a policy of general 
appeasement *• Lord Tyrrell, British ambassador in Paris, 
wrote oh Maroh 20;
The coarse of events in Germany is turning 
France;increasingly towards close collaboration with 
Great BritSL n and America * « ♦ France has lost
confidence in the satellite system as a means of 
containing Germany; she realises she cannot stand 
alone¿and she is becoming more and more conscious \ 
of the necessity of her retaining British good will*;'
in the midst Of this atmosphere MacDonald and Simon
arrived in Paris from Rome on March 21. Their immediate aim 
was to try to sell the Mussolini plan to the French Ministers 
The whole matter was presented to the Freneh in these words!
Firstly,: they all knew that the danger was 
Impendihg; that Germany might, announce that she 
would reafm without agreement# . Secondly,, they all 
knew.that'Germany and perhaps her former allies 
might claim that the revision of frontiers should 
be considered without reaching agreement with 
others*:' Thirdly,: they must Consider"whether there 
were any means of providing against these dangers 
more especially by (an) agreement limiting the , 
methods to-be employed and which would have the 
signature of not'only■Germany, but also of Italy 
* : - * *■we,. should be in a bad'position if we gave way 
to an explicit barman threat; prudence dictated 
that wé should forestall such demands.25
The French Ministers replied to the British by/pointing 
out their fears, about thè Italian proposals♦ They expressed 
concern about the relation of the proposed Four-Power Pact *2
oh
- Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919-39» 2» IV, J4.6Ó
2^Ibld., 2i %  91^92?. 96»
to the League of Nations, and as to "how far the new propo-
salà went beyond what was already contained in the Covenant
ofs
of thè League of Nations, especially Article 19*" Dalad- 
ier enquired of the'British Ministers at the. Paris confer­
ence If the Mussolini proposalsrinte^ded to destroy, modify,
or "get round" Article 19 of the Covenant, which dealt with
27
revision of treaties. Prance also raised objections to 
article III of the Italian, plan as it provided for German 
rearmament without a corresponding provision for French 
security*2® .
The French Ministers also expressed concern as to how 
the interests of states other than the four mentioned would 
be represented, considered and safeguarded. Prance was espe­
cially Concerned about the opposition which Poland and Czech­
oslovakia were bound to have to revision of frontiers. In 
brief, she insisted that, the "interests and propertiesn of'
29
her allies could not be disposed of without consulting them, 
Basically^ the French attitude was that it was necessary 
to create a liaison between the pact and the League of Na­
tions, while issues raised in articles II and ITI Of the 
Italian plan should be dropped for the time being, "since
2^Pocuments on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39» 2, V, 103♦ 
27Ibld.é 89.
28Ibid,,. 9k*
29Ibid*, 90,, IO3* ,
the reference to disarmament would be compromising to the 
League,of Nations# whilst to raise treaty revision at the 
same time as the announcement of collaboration of the four 
Powers would create great agitation among other nations*”^  
Thé Paris conference concluded with MacDonald making a 
final effort to ensure that Prance would not reject the plan* 
He°warned that France and Great Britain were old fashioned# 
"Unless they put new energy into their countries * * * they 
would be overwhelmed»; Lenin# dead in the Kremlin# was keep­
ing Russia awake# and Mussolini was reanimating Italy* They 
saw the.same movement spreading into Germany*"^
While these high level conversations'were going on among 
the four Great Powers a deafening chorus of newspaper clamor 
over the Four-Power Pact proposals had arisen in Europe. The 
Press, especially in France,'Poland and the Little Entente 
countries# put all kinds of interpretations to the Anglo* 
Italian communique issued in Rome# which simply said:
After a full and exhaustive exchange of ideas
on the general situation# the Ministers examined in 
their conversations a-project for an UMersfahding 
oil the larger political, questions ¡put forward by the 
head of the Italian Government with the object of 
securing the.collaboration of the Four’Western 
Powers’ in an effort to promote#, in the spirit of
r \
^ Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-39» 2, V# 97»
, • /
31ibld*. 96.
•fell© Kellogg Pact and thé * No Forced declaration* _ 
a long period of peace for Europe and the world*,32
Indeed, an .acute and immédiate storm was arbused by the Ital­
ian proposals« Poland and the hittie Entente Countries were 
hysterical» Most flench newspapers denounced the plan*
•aii
Mussolini felt depressed and pessimistic* At Geneva the
suspicion gained strength that the plan was designed to 
^dish” the League of Nations*^
It was evident that the pact negotiations would be hamp­
ered by the strong criticism directed at it by the smaller 
Powers, MacDonald* in an effort to improve the situation* 
declared on March 23? %  * . so far as the /Romé? conver­
sations are Concerned,' they /the small Pov/ers>7 have no founds 
ation Whatever for their fears* and I,wish to make it clear 
that, in our view, these smaller States have a right to be 
consulted wherever their special interests are concerned * ."3^ 
On the same day,. Hitler made a speech emphasizing the 
peaceful: intentions of Germany* Hp further declared;
Wè recognize that the British Government, in 
their last proposals at Geneva* have,made an effort 
to move the 2^ sarmamenib7 conference to rapid
32vyneeler»»BenriQtt|; The Pipe Dream; of Peace* 130. Regardr­
ing Press attacks see also The Times Thohdon) *• March 20,
1933, P.. 12 ■
33pocuments on British Foreign Policy* 1919*39, 2, V, I0I4.. 
3^-Ibid.» 105.
^Wheeler-Bennett (éd*)* Documents bn International 
Affairs, 1933» 25ld
décisions' i i .*'• The plan of the chief of the 
Italian Government is oven more extensive*, and we 
attribute, the* rooet ^ sehlous iraportance to itf Wè 
ape prepared to co-iopepate in the attempt to bring 
the four Power s - -Germany* Italy*1 Engl and-and 
Franc ©--together for peaceful polit IcàjL co-operations 
and for a ' e é u n â g e o u s - decided approach tp, the 
tasks on which the fatè^pf Europe depends*3o.
These reaasurihg ..statements* however*, touched the prob­
lem of opposition to the; pact on the surface only* There 
were important; factors influencing opinion lh France and the 
Little Entente countries, where opposition' to Mussolini Vs 
ideas was deep seated*
The paramount consideration in the formulation of French 
foreign policy was that of security* France was 'epnsclpus of 
her permanent-weakness against Germany. During the postwar 
years, PrahCè was preoccupied with the problem of assuring 
her security*. Various attempts were made in this respect: 
the organization of a network of alliances (la méthode' de la 
contrainte or la politique de la Ruhr)» thé organization of 
security at Geneva (la methods de la persuasion) which re­
garded Locarno and the Disarmament Conference as a means of 
obtaining security, Eut the rise of Hitler in, Germany tended 
to discredit the French, system of security, and aroused fears 
and anxiety in France* ,The. Mussolini plan* advocating
3 6pocuffl8nt3 on British Foreign Policy* 1919-39» 2, IV, 1^ 80*
recognition of German equality and revision, of treaties* 
seemed to provide a fInai blow to the French system of secur­
ity* fhe pro status quo policy of France and her ailles was 
now faced with the «challenge of fascist dynamism driving for 
greater poweh> broader political influence and, larger colon­
ial possessionsj and threatening to destroy French influence 
in the Danube* in the Balkans and the Medi terranean ». A con-
s' ‘ ‘ ; ‘ V • . • 0
temporary account summed up the situation in France well:
"It is evident that¿between threatening events in Germany 
and pressure from the allies.of France in Eastern Europe* 
French opinion* though fundamentally pacific and anxious fór 
conciliation^ is;on the whole afraid of now risks * » » *"37 
The nature pfFrench reaction to the Mussolini proposals 
is revealed in the various newspaper accounts* Most news­
papers denounced the proposed pact as an attempt to establish 
a directory of four Powers in orderto isolate France» Italy 
and Britain would thereby be able to act as brokers between 
France and Germany, A typical example was the influential 
Temps& which declared:
« » .it is clear that the plan would compiete 
the ruin Cf thè League if adopted and would have 
the direct and immediate effect of destroying equal­
ity among nations at Geneva,
3?The Times (London)6 March 25a 1933» PI 12*
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Ib is di'ëçonéerting^ that Mr.:, MacDonald should.
'not see ’that the revision of treaties on the; terras 
, ; ; , proposed by Germany ahd Italy* far fromgiving bet» • «
ter assurance of pqsce* would Inevitably lead to war*™
The Italian draft leaked Out in Paris and was published 
in Paris ort March 30*: The publication Of the draft, led to
renewed attacks on the pact| especially the articles dealing 
with treaty revision and, the colonial question Came under 
bittercondemnation.»;-^ .
The.most serious opposition to the pact came from Edouard 
Harriot> who qs. chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Com- 
\ mittee, and as a former Prime Minister* exercised immense 
influence on French policy* Hepriot denounced the proposed 
Four-Power Pact as an attempt to establish a hierarchy of 
; states in which Italy and Germany would be united against 
; y France, while she would be left at the mercy of Britain*^ -0 
i; In spite of the overwhelming opposition to the pact*
both in Parliament as well as in public, Daladier faced the 
problem, with courage 'and a,; sincere desire, to Serve the cause 
of peace and çoneillation*.^’ The pro*government newspaper 
the Volonté expressed the official attitude, wells
^ T h e  Times {London) * . March 25, 1933» P* 12 .
^Vi/heeler-Bennett, The, Pipe Dream of Peace* I3I4. •
^°The Times Chondon) March 1933* p* I3 .
— Foreign Relations of the United States* Diplomatic 
Papers* 1933* I* h21* Sée also Documents on British Foreign 
Policy*
Let us say that if the changes pro—
posed by Signor Mussolini' can definitely assure 
'peace*'1' ' b e  wrong to reject them a priori* 
We have;often stated that the status quo is unten­
able } to maintain it at all costs means either 
leaving the field open for war or preserving an 
insuperable obstacle to the organization of mutual 
assistance and the international control of arma*
■ ' ,'ments i1*1?
Another French leader who played an important role in 
furthering the. cause Of the pact was de Jouvenel* Through 
repeated personal Contacts he endeavoured to influence poli-«» 
ticians and Foreign Ministry officials in Paris in favor Of
the pact. One writer points out that de Jouvenel "always 
remained a fervent advocate of the plan to the point of in-
forming his government that if it were not accepted* he 
would resign his post as Ambassador*
An important factor in determining the attitude of the 
French government towards the pact was the fear of Isola— 
tion* Both Daladier and Paul^Bohcour were aware that if the 
other three Powers accepted the Mussolini plan* French rejec­
tion of it would be unwise:* It would not only isolate her*
^ T h e  Times (London)< March 25« 1933« P* 12*
^Luigi ' VIllarl* It all an Foreign Policy under Mussolini» 
102*, Thei author states that this statement was made to him 
by the then Italian. Under^Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs* Fulvio Suvich* Regarding de Jouvenel* s role see- 
also* Foreign Relations of the United States* 1933» I* J122-23J 
The Times (London)¿/duly 17* 1933 i and Documents oh British 
foreign Policy* 1919-395 2* V* 3ol«> - • -
but bring upòn France the Odium of haying torpedoed a prop©* 
aai for the pacification: Of Europei It would also encourage 
the Itaio-German bloc
In the ôiretMBgtâhceàii France was interested In trying to 
work out an acceptable Four-Power Pact* De Joüvènel expressed 
such à view on March 30^ sayihg that ”* $ * there' had been a 
gradual improvement in the French attitude towards the Four- 
Power Pact and that the French government* the French press# 
and what was more important^ also M* Harriot*, were more fav­
orably incline d *
The basic French Concern regarding the role Of the 
League of Nations and the question of her security* however* 
remained In considering the Four-Power Pact <* She was opposed 
to any treaty commitments within the four Powers which would 
give the impression of being à formation of a group Of states 
alongside the League of Nations*^ Paül-Boncour clarified 
the French position in this respect on March 26* saying that 
France regarded the Mussolini proposals as containing ^possible
1 ' r, .
• 'V * • ’ ‘
^Similar opinion is expressed by Wheeler-Bennetti The 
Pipe Dream of Peace* 1» 13ÌU and Elizabeth R* , Gamer on* Prologue 
to Appeasement* À *§tudy In French Foreign Policy (Washington*
V7 C*V I9Ì4.2) * 33T  Pauï*Æôncour makes no mention of any such 
Consideration in his memoirs*
^Documents on BritfshForelgn Policy * 1919*39* 2* V* 117»
I AL ■ ' ~ . ,
^ Documents on German Foreign Policy* 19l8-k5* C* I* 218»
elements of appeasement., he insisted they must be
applied, within the framework of the League of Nations* 
Paul*Boncour also pointed out that there should be a strict 
understanding among the four ■Powers "that the equality of 
Status of. all members of the League would be preserved * The
Covenant# the. whole Covenant ^ and nothing but the Covenant 
was still# and would remain# the guiding principle of French 
policy,"^ As regards the question of security France 
expressed the view that as questions of "revision” and of ,
’’equality" were; raised in the pact, she felt "obliged to 
stand by the declaration of November ^Lécemberj7 1 1 th, 1932# 
and to connect these two questions with the question of
jo s '
security*:'"^
A series of conferences were held in Paris between March 
30 and April 2.*v £#ladie% Paul-Boncourÿ de Jouvenel and the 
Little Entente, and . Polish Ministers led by Nicolae Tituleseu 
met to consider the Italian plan and.to formulate French
■ JÙ.0 ■amendment s to it «
While the directors of policy in Paris tended generally
to favor the idea of European conciliation, and were prepared
^ T h e  Times (London) # March 28#. 1933# P* 13«
^Foreign Relations of the United States# Mplomatic 
Papers,- 1933# 'i#' 399Ai4.0Q«;.
^ T h e  Times (London)March 31#; April .1#,:.2$ ..1933*v .
to consider possible ways of compromise* reactions to the
Italian plan assumed .almos^ t unanimous opposition in the 
allied; countries* indeed the opposition in Poland and the 
Little Entente countries proved to be of far-reaching con-*
sequence #  ^/.■■
In Poland news of the Mussolini plan Was received with 
"concern almost amounting to consternation»"'^ The Polish 
press of all shades of opinion was unanimous in denouncing 
the proposals»^ The proposed Four-Powbr Pact affected Poland 
On "the two points onwhiohbeyondall others the Poles always 
show extreme sensitiveness^-the creation in any form of a 
Concert of Powers from which they are excluded arid any threat 
of revision of théîr frontierSi.Gn the latter point at all 
events feeling ^ ^ ^ a g 7  intense* deep-seated and Universal# 
and » /no/ Polish Government could affp.rd. to ignore it «
Polandf s amouf bfopre was hurt and she deeply resented 
the Italian attempt to create a hierarchy among European 
powers*^ leaving Poland out of the select group of the Big 
. Four. Poland regarded her3èlf as a great or at least as a 
sémiagréât Power; at any rate she was the greatest of t.h® 
lesser Powers *
^Documents on British Foreign Policy* 19.19*39* g# V* III; 
% b i d *a 335# -
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pione 1 Jozef Becfe^ Final Report New York, 195% 35»
3?
There was also the Important consideration that the 
.FotirwPowe.r Pact represented a revival of, the, Locarno treaties, 
which had made no.provisions for the security of Germany's 
borders with Poland«: Poland had only reluctantly accepted
the Locarno arrangements, The,situation was now à Very dif­
ferent one* Thé rise of the Nazis,in Germany caused anxiety 
in Poland^ Marshal Joz© f Pi1sudskl repeatedly warned Dalad- 
1er during March that Germany was rearming and was determined 
to pursue the^PbÌloy-vQ-f-'.I?ranff. nach Óstén,; In the circuia-* 
stances# thé Marshal was "determined not again to be manOeü* . 
vred" into accepting an arrangement that would tend to 
appease Germany« ■. Also, Pilsudski "saw above all that the 
pact wa3 a menace to thé rights and interests of the smaller ; 
powers threatened by tile Great Powers Cartel# ” especially as 
the apparatus of the,League of Nations would be "abused*1 and . 
other small 'péwèp0;'f^ é4tiòéd;/tó the stato of "mere puppets« ”&  
in a conversation with the British Prime Minister in 
Geneva' oh' Máfch' 17, - Pplish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck 
pointed out that the; method by which a revision of treaties 
was effected was a matter of the highest importance for 
Poland# fot* the P.eape Treaties "wane' contracts, and the
S^Beck* Final Report, 38* Also see V¡!hóeler*Bénnett,
Munich* Proïéigué to Tragedy (New York, 19^8)# .2831 and Doc­
uments on British Foreign Policy# 191SK32# 2, V# 335#
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consent of thè parties was necessary for their mpdifica- 
tion*"55 On the; basis of this Poland later emphasized her 
opposition to the Italian plan# stating that:
■V;
■''v
ïho propoëals; for a Four-Power Pact would 
amount to an attempt to imposo the views of, thé. 
four Powers on other States* such as Poland* in 
matters in which Poland was intimately Ooricerhed* 
‘-J* tho position Of, the Polish Government nèces- 
wàs that they could not contemplate.being 
with a fait accomplis hut were entitled* 
In accordance with their equal membership of the 
League of Nations* to bo a party to deliberations 
and a consenting party to conclusions
As a first measure to obstruct the course of Pour--Power
Pact negotiations., the Polish government announced (falsely) 
that after a round of interviews with the French and Little 
Entente ministers in Warsaw* Foreign Minister Beck would 
lead the organization of a vigorous and Concerted opposition 
to the pact proposals» This bluff* however* proved Unsuc* 
éeësfùî*^ Subsequently Poland countered by striking di­
rectly at Italy* The newly appointed ambassador to Rome* 
Gount George Potocki* whose appointment M d  been popularly 
received in Italy* offered his resignation in protest of
■Documents On British Foreigh Policy» 1919»3^» 2* V*
Documents on British porelgn Policy, 1919*39» 2* V*
57,
?$
Italian policy*?® At the same time, Poland made a déclara** 
tio^i th^éatenih^^to^leave; the league of !Sablons# The situ* 
ation was properly summed up by the British ambassador In
39
Warsaw# who wrote# ”1 must say# In conclusion#; that the pros­
pect Of securing acceptance by thè Polis I Government of the 
proposals in anything like their present
' go ;
extremely remote « - 7
/
In the hittie Entente countries# rei 
lini proposals were similarly unfavorably# There were deep» 
seated apprehensions about Italian designs# On larch 17 
foreign Minister Eduard Benesof Czechoslovakia gave an slab*
" ; ; ,\v l -■ ‘
orate expression to thè Little Entente fears about Italian
f orm séeiriS to me
actions to the Musso»
policy» He stated that he had satisfied 
evidence of Italians who had had cenvers 
Mussolini# and fro» other, sources# that:
himself# from the 
itions with Signor
Thé real aim of Italian policy was to exploit 
the present situation in Yugoslavia jby abetting the 
break»up of its unity# taking Dalmatia for them* 
selves# and alloting Croatia, to. Austria and Hungary» 
After this had been achieved# their jthlrdmeasure of 
treaty revision would be the Corridor« M* de 
Jouvenel^ talks in Rome showed that! Italy wished a 
free hand from France for the above settlement # and 
that then 'Italy would be ready to settle her rela­
tions with Prance* . '
Thé history of these /tittle EntentjeJ coun­
tries for centuries past been their Use by
Beck# Pinal Report# 3?» Beck writes# ”1 made a bargain
with *- * « Count Potocki# that he
^Documents onBrltlsh Foreign Policy> 1919»39» % V* 115
would resign * » .*•'
other great Nations? now Imperialist an
1 st Italy /Is/ trying to repeat hist>ry*^S 
The Little Entente countries* indeed* feared the challenge 
of. the Itailan^AuatrC.-HTungarian tripartite collaboration*
The FpUr^PowemPact proposals had the effect of reinforcing 
their fears* and led to an immediate united front of oppo* 
sltion* determined to frustrate Italian designs *
pn March 25* 1933* the Permanent Coinèil of thé Little 
Entente in Geneva issued a coranuniqué accusing the four great 
Powers.of attempting to violate the Covenant of the League of 
Nations* Thè communique aharplyeriticiaed the Mussolini
•ni nn S
. any col1âboration between States with a view 
to establishing friendly relations between them* 
and regulating those questions.that concern them 
exclusively» is desirable and wholesome « All the 
same » the - stages of the Little -Entente' would find 
it difficult to agree that the cause!of good rela- 
tions between countries was being served by agree­
ments having it as their object to dispose of the 
rights of third partles--and this eqùally whether 
these agreements bind the signatories to take con­
crete decisions, or Whether, the object is simply to 
exert pressure upon Countries other than the con­
tracting parties * Sine© no body c a m  dispose of any* 
body else’s property either directly|pr indirectly* 
the States of the .¿ittlé Entente formulate* from 
now OnWardSi the most explicit reserves with regard 
to the eventual conclusion of any agreement Of thé 
kind* in respect of anything that touches their own 
.rights and polity* Agreements of this,nature belong 
to the past* and certainly to times anterior to the
60
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The States of 
in the hegbti*
foundation of thè League of Nations* 
thè Little Entente also regret that# 
ations of thè last few days# the idea of^revisionist 
policy should have been emphasized * | * ^
communique further emphasized that revisionist policy
would not prove conducive to creating pe acè and confidence
or mutual cooperation in Europe# and that theLittle Entente
Powers would energetically Oppose such ajpolicy.
Following the cOBÉiuniquei the various Little Entente 
ministers called on the British Foreign Secretary# Sir John 
Simon# in Geneva*, Their conversations firther reveal the 
nature of thè Little Entente opposition ;0 the Four-Power 
Pact proposals*;
Dr* Bènès# who was the first to call on Simon# warned 
that Czechoslovakia would reject any measure of revision of 
frontiers imposed by the great powers* lie pointed out that 
it was ridiculous to false the Issue of Revision when eco«* 
nomic crises were fostering a spirit of militant nationalism 
ih Europe* To prove his point * Benes explained:
‘ ' ■ ' : : j : 1 . '
% * * the treaty of Trianon had included within the 
frontiers of Czechoslovakia between f00$QOÓ and 
700¿000 Hungarians» On the other side of the border 
it had included In Hungary some 300*000 Slovaks* 
According to the latest census returns there were 
now only 120*000 Slovaks in Hungary whereas the
^Toynbee (ad*j# Survey of International Affairs* 1933 
.♦15 • For the Little Entente GommuniqUe# see also 
Wheeler-Bennett# Documents on International Affalrsi 
252i and The Times (London)y March 27* 1933* pV 12*
ij.2
number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia had risen 
above 700¿000* ïhis showsd the policy of Oppression 
andelìmlriatìóh practiced by the Hungarian Govern­
ment in regard.to their Slovak minority » •
'Bond's warned Simon that revision of
from outside* would be opposed- by the tittle Entente* and
■ 9 ♦'
frontiers* dictated
that far from removing the idea of opposing ’blocs• of power 
in Europe* the Pour-PowerPaot would lead to a hostile anti­
revisionist bloc arrayed, against the revisionist bloc*
On March 27 fhutanian Foreign Mini star Titulescu* In 
conversations with Simon* emphasized that article 19 of the
heague Covenant had already provided for 
and that* in the cireumstances* revision 
Power forum would, necessarily imply that
smaller states would be ignored* fié warned that revision of 
frontiers as envisaged in the Mussolini p^bposals. would "inev­
itably provoke ,a very strong reaction*" ine 
insecurity and mutual suspicion would develop to an alarming 
extent »
On the same day the Yugoslav Permanent Representative 
at Geneva conferred with Simon and "emphatically repeated" 
the opinions already expressed by Bones and Titulescu*^
treaty revision* 
through, a four** 
the rights of the .
id a "sensé of
^Documents On British foreign Policy.! 1919^39* 2* V*
Ibid* a - 110*>il»
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It was evident that the” Little Entente countries were united
. ,  ^ : ' ' - j ’■ .
in their resistance to any efforts at revision of the peace 
treaties. ' |
• Sir. ^ ohn SImonj! in his conversations with the Little 
Entente ministers* tried to counteract tiië fears and suspi-
cions expressed by them* He pointed out 
was merély "to seèüre co-operation betwë.
that Britain*8 object 
in the four Great
Powers,; not as a combination against other States, but as a 
means of preventing them from separating into opposite 
camps. He repeated/ MacDonald’s as suri.nce oiUMarch 23 to 
the Little Entente^ that the smaller stai es "Haye a right to 
be consulted wherever their’ Special interests are concerned."
But the fears of the Little Entente Powers had the deeper 
causé' of resentment of Italy and the anxiety resulting from 
the course of events in Germany* fhë pro status-quo pol- 
ioies of France end her allies were now tjéing directly chal­
lenged through the Italian plan. The Little Entente countries
Were conscious, of their relative weakness. At the end of 
March,, 1933,; their respective ministers launched upon a pro«*-
gram of exchange of views* in order to ti 
the pact negotiations« Titulescu sot out
wart the progress of 
on a Visit to Paris 
and London*. on bejbalf of the Little Entente as a whole, to
documents On British'Foreign Policy* m 2 r 2 2 . >  it V» 1 1 3 *
conduct vigorous antimpact campaign * He 
who started a round of visits to Prague*,
was followed by Beck 
Bucarest and Bèl»
Indeed* if the'aim of the Italian plan was international 
appeaseinent| the reactions to his proposals must have been 
very depressing to Mussolini* He could* however* rejoice in 
the knowledge that his diplomatic ingenuity had Successfully 
secured active British as well as German support o f  the pact. 
It now remained to pursue the negotiations with a view to 
Securing a compromise draft* The proposals which Mussolini 
created early in March had become publici The first step
• ■ • . I • ,■
had been taken* |
!;
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/  ' ANXIOUS NEGOTIATIONS
Negotiations progressed slowly afte 
tions to Mussolini ?s proposal« The Idea 
Pact brought to the forefront the crueia 
ing. the European .nations*
» the Initial read* 
óf a Four-Power 
L problems disturb* 
ss of Britain and
Italy to cooperate was* howeyer#: an encouraging factor«A As
a high degree theHassell remarked? ”It is obvious to what 
English attitude will be decisive for thb content and fate
After the Rome discussions* the Britishof the »2
in a successful con«government had taken a firm stand.to aid 
elusion of thè pact negotiations? Brita :n regarded the Mus­
solini proposals as r,a material contribution to European 
peace,, n and as oontrihutlng to . the elimination .of the rise 
of ibldcs * in Europe * She also supported the pact because 
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soon moved Into à position 
'discussions* During' the later part!
of leadership in thô 
of March both Mac**
Donald and Simon gave necessary as sur anejes to the Little
Éntente'Dowers ^  Various matters raised'. £n the Mussolini
pían were effectively reviewed. Sir.JotL Simon expressed
the British attitude well»
Collaboration in this cónnexiorj ¿is7 an effort 
to secure for a period of.years that]there should ; 
not be á: split in European policy which might result 
in the ' four Powers finding themsplveis in Opposing 
blocs#' lb© object /Ts7 to a©cufe|'.co|-opOration as 
between themselves*, not to impose conclusions on 
others' without : consulting the other parties Who ]]&£} 
< ■intQhested'.Ín;.thóm#^:. ry. ' /■ . . . <■,: ?
• As. for frontier revision*, it be remem­
bered thal; thef question is not disposed: ,pf by refuW.-- ; 
ing to mention It*, for in eepfcainquarters' it is 
• much ■ in people * s minds * ' - Consequently*. it might well 
be that theslgnatUreof thé four PoWers;to; some 
agreed and limiting machinery might promote European 
peace than induce hew elements of disturbance#^
* * ,> an essential prerequisite! to any 
effective có*óherátion between thé f'pur Great 
must, consist in agreement between thp four Powers 
to support the British Draft Disarmament Convention 
and to recommend it,to- the Conference*»
■4 4 * the proposed agreement > should in no sense 
 ^be regarded as a substitute for* or as set in ôppo* 
sitien' to*.' the Covenant of the League, of Nations*
It is not a.piece of rival or competing machinery,
•■Seë p# 29#
^Documents On British Foreign Polley
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but la framed for thè purpose of operating within 
the áwbít of the Govenaht and In fulfilment of Its 
■ObjéctV5
The British government was basically/very'satisfled 
with the -Italian.'initiative# MacDonald wrote to Mussolini 
On Biarch 31:
Theidea of awritten agreement providing for 
Four-Power understanding and co-operationia so good 
and so promising in results that it is 'Worth making 
great efforts and even sacrifices to achieve sue* 
cess# For this we must destroy all these prelims 
inary doubts and suspicions« so as to be able to get 
to the purpose of the plani which is the removal by
Co-operation of; the causes which at present frighten# 
and thereby threaten to divide the European Powers 
into opposing blocs# and thus in the end to make war 
inevitable!#?
fieiations betweeh Britain and Italy improved as a result 
Of thCir enthusiastic support of the Four-Power Pact• On 
March 31#. Sir John Simon wrote to the British ambassador in 
Romei Sir èonald Oraham#; that the pact negotiâtiona should 
be considered "Urgent fréni point of view of Signor Mussolini’s 
own personal feeling which at present very friendly to
ug and frotó that Of his influence Over -Hitler# who /aeeni^-f 
by agreeing to principle of pact, to have reverted to Streae- 
mann policy;**’^0 On the same day Italy made a friendly
• ' - . • ' .• M  '
û : *
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gesture toward Britain by announcing her compiete acceptance 
of the British Draft Disarmament Convention* presented in 
Geneva on March;16# This! gesture was interpreted in London 
as an Italian sacrifice to assist the cause of four-Power 
cooperation«^
On April 1 an amended. British draft was presented in 
Rome * The new draft erabodled,the Brit1#h at tit ùdé to the 
original Italian text: ■
■ , V  : ' r . ' •
The four Western Powers: France, Germany*
Great Britain* Italy* undertake to carry out between 
themselves ‘an effective, policy of co-operation in 
order to ensure the maintenance of peace in the 
. spirit of the Kellogg Pact and Of the ‘RO resort to 
force’ Pact envisaged: by the declaration signed by 
the above Powers ’.;ón Dèbembei*- li* ■193^*;: ’•
.: ’■ . ■■ • ; %  ■ , '/ '
The four Powers confirm that* while the provi­
sions of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
embody a scruplous respect,for all treaty obliga* 
tions as a means of achietihg inteiuiatiCnal peace 
and security* they also contemplate, the possibility 
of the revision of,the treaties.of peace whéh con­
ditions arise that might lead to a conflict between 
nations* . ; .
In order to facilitate the operation of Article 
19 of thè Covenant the four Powers recommend that if 
and when a Government raises any particular question 
involving treaty revision* the situation; shall be 
clarified in the first place by means of negotiations 
to be Carried on and agreements to be reached* on an 
equal footing* between the four Powers- 'and the GOvern* 
ments directly concerned) such negotiations "and
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Agreements to be based, on the mutual recognition of 
thé interests of, all concerned and within.the frame­
work of the league of Nations. '
; ' 3¡: / ,
■ It is agreed that the principle of equality of 
rights as conceded to Germany under the conditions 
laid down in the, Flve^Pd%r Resolution of December 11 
must begiven a practical value» The four Powers 
recognise that the draft Disarmament Convention sub­
mitted by .the United Kingdom delegate.to the Disarm­
ament Conference on March 1 Ó not only gives effect 
to this principle but provides Satisfactorily for 
the first stage of general disarmament* and they 
accordingly undertake to recommend it to- the Disarm­
ament Conference for Acceptances Germany* for her. 
parti agrees that thè principle of equality of 
rights, shall only be put into; practice by degrees . 
under agreements to which each of the four Powers 
• must hé a. party*
k '
The application of súCh principle‘ of equality 
Of rights to Austria* Hungary and Bulgaria shall be 
governed by thé' same conditions as those expressed 
ih the case of Germany in the preceding article and 
only under agreements to which each of tho four 
Powers must be m  party*
■ v '>
, The four Powers pledge themselves to co-operate 
in the work offinding solutions of the economic 
difficulties which how face their respective nations 
and the world as a whole. . : .
.. ’ ‘ ' 6 7 • / > . ■ ■. . ’
The present agreement of understanding and co­
operation will* if necessary#) be submittedfor the 
approval of the Parliaments of the contracting 
Powers within' three months of the date of its sig«* 
nature. Its duration shall be fcr ten years* If 
no notice is given before t h e e h d o f  the ninth year 
by any Of the parties pf an intention to treat it 
as terminated at the end of such ten,; years*; It shall 
be regarded as renewed for another period of ten 
. years * ■
' ■ •; ; : „ k9
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Thè present agreement shall be registered In 
accordàncè with the Covenant of the League- of 
Nations* at the Secretariat of the League of 
Nations* -2
The British draft proposed two fundamental changes. 
Whereas the Italian text affirmed "the principle of revision” 
in article II> the British draft merely contemplated "the 
possibility nf revision*". The question of German equality# 
raised Ih article III;was linked to the Five-Power Declara­
tion of Decomberli* 193%  and its practical application con­
ditioned by thé' fpur-Pô\?èr,• acOéptancé of the MacDonald 
Disarmament Plan* .
Mussolini was not Very pleased; with, ther British amend­
ments . Hassell reported In this connection from Rome:
Mussolini seemed to me to have no very great 
hope of succèss^any longer. * * >.•*’ Mussolini 
stated that his proposal' had been a boy at firsts 
the English now wanted to make a hermaphrodite out 
.of it and in the hands of the French it would be-, 
cóme a'girl#,, Ho would not,, play that game* for he 
• wanted it to stay a boy¿13
However^; Italy accepted., the British draft of'April 1» and 
this version was now to become the basis of the- ensuing dip­
lomatic negotiations
7
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Germany was definitely perturbed by the British amend«* 
menta proposed at the Rom© conference and now included In the 
new British text# In her opinion they involved ^such ©3sen» 
tial changes in the,original Italian proposal that the basic 
ideas of the latter ^ e r e 7 thereby not only impaired but 
converted into entirely the opposite*"^ • ?
Germany was dissatisfied with article II of the British
draftÿ which put increased emphasis on the league of Nations*
role in affecting any treaty revisioni Foreign Minister Von
Neurath explained thè .situation:.. ./ t .
The English version of the idea of revision is> 
first of allí characterized explicitly as a mere state- 
ment and répétition of what the League of Nations'^ 
Covenant provides in Article 19 in this respect*
More significant yet. is the fact that the Eng­
lish version renders the aCtual condition for a 
revisión Of thé peace treatiss in a form that gives 
wrong direction tp the entire principle; of revision*
With the words “when conditions arise" revision is 
made éntireiy.íContingent upon circumstances that 
might arise ;intthe/future* It ip . therefore no 
longer admitted that the peace treaiies have created 
a situation that was untenable/from the start or 
has in any.case proved untenable as a result of 
developments sinceIplp* but ft/la only termed a 
possibility that the peace treaties might sometime 
in the future provò in heed cf revision *'* f If 
the possibility: of revision is envisaged in the 
event that conditions-arise in the future that could 
lead to conflict> the torId would praoticaliy have 
to consider this as an incentive for bringing about 
such conditions and conflicts * * * we cannot agree 
to the omission of thè statement character!zing the
^Documents on German Foreign Policy* I9l8-li5¿ C, 1^ 2I4.8 ♦
peace treaties as materially in need of revision 
even on the basis of present circumstances* Other* 
wise the mention of the idèa of revision In the 
pact would not be a step forwardf but backward from 
the present‘condition*
We may admit that it is not possible simply to 
exclude the League of Nations in thè matter of 
treaty revision* If the unpromising procedure pro­
vided for In Article 19 of the Covenant were to 
remain, howeverg. the entire substance of the new 
pact would be meaningless and in çontradlot jon with 
its fimdanientai'! idea according' to; which the politi- 
cal initiative inthe large issues is be placed 
in the hands of the four Great Powers• -
Aa regards articlesIII of the British draft* Germany 
resented the fact that her comments*.,which had been commun-, 
icated to London on March 30¿ had been ignored* Germany had 
expressed the view that rearmament ’by stages’ would be 
acceptable to her only for the' period of f ivè years and not 
ten; and she had submitted an amended article III for oonsld 
eration by Britain
' The four Powersreiterate theifresolveto • 
cooperate in the Disarmament Conference with the 
other States- there represented in seeking,to work 
out a Convention which shall effect a substantial 
reduction and aviimitation of armaments with pro­
vision for future revision.with a view to further 
reduction* But, should the Disarmament Conference 
lead to only partial results, Italy* Prance and 
, Great Britain declaré that the equality Of rights 
granted to Germany must have a practical effect•
« Á
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Germanys on the other hand» undertakes# for the 
duration.of the first Disarmament Convention* to 
put this: equality of rights into practice by degrees 
laid down in an agreement to be concluded without 
delay by the four Powers in the usual diplomatic 
way* ••■ • . ■
Germany.was perturbed by the British article III* Her 
objections were adequately expressed by thé Foreign Minister 
who pointed out t • ,
The present text stipulates* without ; any qual­
ification as to time or fact#, that Germany may#
Under all circumstances* obtain her equality only 
by successive treaty arrangements with thé other 
Powers * This would mean that eyen beyond)the per- 
. ibd/ofthe first dlsaritaiaent convention# we would 
in our rearmament measures always remain dependent 
on the consent of the other Powers* even if for some 
reason or other;there should be no further disarma« 
ment conventions» The other Powers would in such a 
casé be released from all armament restrictions 
basCd oh treaties# while in the sphere of;armaments* 
Germany would not be permitted to do anything with­
out thé consent of the other Powers * * *■ # We 
must, make it clear to them Britain and Italy/ that 
it)is an absolutely decisive point for us* that* 
after the first convention has expired# our legal 
position must in. no way be worse than the position 
•' of ariy other P o w e r .... ' j.
Germany also objected to the reference in British article 
III that thé MacDonald Disarmament plan should be accepted by 
all the four Powers# and also to the mention of recognition 
of German equality, strictly under the terms of the Five>Power 
Declaration of December 11# 1932* She complained: "In this
^Documents on German Foreign Policy* 1918 «45¿ C# I# 215*
way the coupling of ..©quality with the question of security 
6; ,*• * would be established in principle for all time*
: . There was also dissatisfaction in Berlin about the 
e&clusiòh ^from the Brltisii article Ì of the ‘political idea4 
contained in Mussolini4© article I, that a “concert1’ of thé
four Powers would bring pressuré to bear on other states in
' » pn
order that a common policy of peace may be adopted* •
German opposition was bound to have serious effect on 
the conduct of negotiationsl Germany was conscious of this. 
In footg she feared that if her persistence in her objections 
’’encountered a solid front Of rejection“ by other three 
Powers she would be Isolated#/ Such isolation Germany was 
determined to “oOUnteract vrith all the means at her com* 
mandi“^1. Consequently* Vpn Neurath instructed Hassell to 
assure Mussolini that it was ’^precisely the pew Reich Governs 
ment that ¿attache^ the greatest.importance to the success 
for Mussolini’S iniativej”22 and MuSsc^ini^ in: t w ^  promised 
Germany that her objections would be kept in mind,2^
■ 19 ’
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Meanwhile* the. German ambassador in London was in­
structed to express German "astonishment'* at the British 
draft of April. 1* in fact*. Germany warned Britain that: the 
pact negotiations would suffer if Britain sought "to conduct* 
more,or less behind our back* negotiations which affected 
primarily. Germany * s vital interests*"^
Britain* on the other hand* explained that it was neces­
sary to modify the Italian draft and to weaken article II by 
which therword trovisionf was to appear for the first time 
since the war in an official document! in order to encourage 
French acceptance Of the pact* Britain assured Germany that 
she had ho ‘categorical.objections! to her demands but it was 
necessary to .compromise inorder to avoid a rejection of the 
pact idea by France« At the same time* Germany was warned
that the pact negotiations' would fail* if she- insisted, in her
25 - . •
demands, ^ „>
In France* public opinion was uneasy* The activities 
of the.Nazis in Germany paused rising excitementJ the perse­
cution of the Jews especially led to, talk of war against 
Germany* The Fovp?-Power Pact came under fire as a deep laid
^Documents on German ^preikh Follcya; 19*18-1*^ 0 C* I* 250
n f 9* ' r
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Italo-German p l o t T h e  British ambassador In Paris ©x- 
plained the situations "The repudiation of Président Wilson 
;r by the American Senate has sunk deep1 into the minds of the 
IB French people* who are not too sure that they may hot ; again 
Bi; be let down by America* that Great Britain may not conse~
quently withdraw’into hér sheïl> and that they will not still 
be left to face alone t h e ifërmah colossusi*2? ; B.
In the, midst of thi à hostile atmosphere* Daladier worked 
with courage and tact to obtain French endorsement of the 
B pact* He supported the idea of collaboration but emphasised 
respeei: tor equality of rights Of-all nations* On April 6
he told the French GhamWr of Deputies?
T h e r e i s n o  question of giving our adherence 
to a sort of directory of the Great Powers which..
Would impose their wills upon the rest of Europe** 
a lïbly Alliance which would décidé upon territorial 
revisions and more or less extensive changes of 
frontiers And1 would thereby show itself even more 
ambitious than th® original Holy Alliance* which 
wasvrea;llFaÇonaénvàtive.inatitutlon* Thisenter* 
prlsQwouidcomeinto collision with theFrench^* 
on* natheri Frànco^itaiian^idea of théBéquàiity of 
.-'nations * B«.-, * ■*/ if the new pact is to be useful  ^
it must constitnté a genuine sequel to thôéé. gréais 
constructive^ contributions to the edifice,: Of '
peace to which its own text refers? the 4?6venant
: Documents. of British Foreign Policy* 1919*39» 2* V0 268,,
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oftheLeaguS * * »¿ the Bplan^KelXogs agreamonts 
thS agreements of Iiocax'adi 2^
Daladier mot with considerable opposltion ln tho Ghambertf 
, The Socialists* led by Leon Blum* opposed the pact * Harriet* 
leader of the Budicai-*SoeialistSr*; asserted that the theory 
of alliances and groupings of great Powers had been condemned 
by history and its practice would ereat©new difficulties»
He warned that a FourrPower direotoryy to roshape the polite 
■ teal -map of' Europe* 'would precipitate. war*^9 - '
■ The French Prime' Minister defendedhi a views with great 
courage and strongly advocated a policy.of cautious oo* 
operation* with full regard for the interests of Francefs 
allies* This policy was supported by the Cbamberand Daladlar 
won ah impressive vote of confidence*>*1^ 70 for* 107 against*3® 
Meanwhile* d© Jouvenel was enthusiastically pleading for 
French support of the pact * $hile In Paris he was able to 
dispel many of the French fears and received full cooperation 
from Daladier and Paul-Boneour« The French draft was finally 
drawn up in cooperation between Boneour and de Jouvonel:
^Tovnbee ted*)* Survey of International Affairs* M33* 21iu 
®heeler*Bennett * Document's on Ihterhat'i'ohal'Aff airs * 1913 a 253J* 
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4 After an interview with M*.Boneour* M*i:de Jeuvenel 
had gone home apd had spent the-hlght ih;dh^Wihg up a 
French draft project vdiiçh he had taken toM* Bone our 
/. . . the following ìnorning.* M« Bono our .had produced from 
hie. poçkêh a dra;ftÿ prepared by himself■#: and to 
de Jouvenel's siirprie.e and pleasure the two drafts 
■. . coincided in almost every particular«31
fhè French teit of.the Four^Power Fact was presented in 
Rome on .April Ì933? ;
Germany^ FranCe|; Great; Britain^ and Italy#Con­
scious of the special'responsibilities imposed on 
them by their position as permanent members of the 
Gouncil of the League of Hâtions withhéispéct to 
the League itself and its members# and of those re­
sulting ■ from their joint sighing of the Locarno 
.Agreements; _ _.
• Gonvinced^that the state of màlal^iìiSich pre- 
vails in the world cannot be dispelled except b y a  
strengthening of their solidarity capable of affirm­
ing conf idence ih Europe in peace j
Faithfdi to the Obligations which they.havó 
assumed under the Covenant of the League of Rations# 
the Locarno Agreements# and the B.riand-Rellogg Fact 
and referring to thé Declaration of No-Resort to 
Force», the principle of which was adopted on March 2 
last by the Political Commission of the Disarmament
Conferencej ■* ■
Anxious to give full efficacy to all the pro­
visions of the /Covenant while conforming to the 
methods and procedures which are provided for there!
. from which they do not intend to depart ;
Respectful of the rights bf each state» concern­
ing, which no disposition can be made without the con­
sent of the interested party;
Have agreed1 on the following provisions:
Article I
The High Contracting Parties will consult on 
all question which appertain to them and will strive
31 - ,
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withinthefratnewprk of the League of Nations t o ,
• pürsueaheffèctivepolieyof cooperation amorig 
themselves with a view to maintaining peace*.
■ Article II
The High.Contracting Parties* with a Vie$ to 
th,e possible •.■application. In Europe of the articles 
Of the Covenant^/ particularly articles 10* 16* and 
19* decide to examiné.among themselves* without 
prejudice to.the decisions which can only be taken 
by the regular organs of. the league of Nations *, any
• proposal tending to give full efficacy to the 
methods and procedures provided fbr by these articles*
Article III •
Nenewihg in so fair as they are concerned their 
joint declaration of December 11* 193 2ô ïhe High Con- 
tracting Pàrties see in the recent British draft con­
vention a practical basis of discussion which should 
permit, the Disarmament Conference to work put as 
quickly as. possible a convention assuring a subs tan*» 
tial reduction and limitation of armaments with pro­
visions for its subsequent revision with, a view to 
new reductions«; V Qermanyfor her part recognizes 
: that equality of rights in a system affording secur­
ity for all, nations cannot be realized except by 
stages in accordance with article 6 of the Covenant 
, and by virtue of agreements reached to this effect «.
Article I? ; .
The High Contracting Parties, affirm in general 
their desire to consult on all questions of common 
Interest ih iH^ope* particularly on ail questions 
concerning the restoration of its economy* the regu-* 
lation of which might •#. * .* be profitably sought . 
within thé fràmèwork of the study commission for 
European union* : .
’ - ■ A rticle V




fhe. French draft of April 11« aside from providing a pre- 
'W' amble® brought about a considerable weakening of the original 
article II*.,.. All merition of the word ‘revision’ was ignored. 
Instead® the articles of the League Covenant dealing with.
V the Sanctity of Treaties (article 10)5 the possibility of 
fresh examination of treaties (article 19) and thé applîca- 
tion of sanctions in case of treaty violations (article 16)®, 
were emphasised* 1 Also# no mention was^made of accepting the 
’principles’ contained in these articles® but only the 
’methCls and procedures’^ regarding: them were referred to.
Article II If;'., too.* was weakened and- all reference to Austria® 
Bulgaria® and Hungary, was dropped,
îhe French text Was favorably received in Italy, Musso­
lini stated that® ’’the French draft was considerably better 
than was to be expected; it was also clearer and more sensi­
ble than; the English,” At the same time® Italy assured Ger­
many that further negotiations would be continued only after 
German comments had been received•in Rome,33
c.,- . - .
32Pocuments on German Foreign Policy^ 1918-14.5, C® I® 281- 
82, Also see Foreign. Relations of the lJnlt'ed Spates® Diplomatic
papers® 1933» I». Bo?*
•^^Documents on German Foreign, Policy»- 1918-U5» C®: I® 280®,
See also Documents on British Foreign Policy®: 1919-39» 2® V®
143» 3<%* : .......... ;
A crucial’ point was now reached In the pact negotiations«: 
France had changed but not rejected the Mussolini plan*
There was a sense of anxiety in Britain and Italyj and the 
two Countries worked together in seeking an American declar** 
ation of approval ahd support for the pact. It was felt that 
such a declaration would greatly assist the cause of the pact* 
The Anglo*Italian approaches were* however*, fruitless*^
On April. l2* Germany Instructed her ambassador in Rome 
to immediately see Mussolini* and present German reactions to 
the French draft ■$, -’in order that the French Ideas may not get 
a hold on him and that h© may as far as possible adapt hlm^ 
self to our views even before making his official reply t© 
France."3^
Germany*s objections to the Frendh text of April 11 were 
similar to those she had against the British draft of April lw 
As regards the French preamble Germany felt that emphasis on 
the role of the League of Nations limited the scope of the 
pact to activity, of the four Powers within the League* The 
preamble stipulated.that thé four Powers may never depart from 
the »methods and procedures » provided for in the League Gov- 
enant* Germany resented this emphasis on the role of the
-^ Documents on British Foreign Policy*: 1919*3fta 2* V* I36# 
36I4. See also Foreign ffeiatloha of the United S t a t e s 1933»
I* kQk*
c ,, , '
^■Documents on German Foreign Policya 19l8*li*>. C. I* 28it*
League* saying 4t would strike, a "false not© that /the pact7 
refers Only t o ‘political activity within the League of 
Bâtionsn and would consequently render it "superfluous* "3^ 
The French artiél© II was formally rejected by Berlin 
on the basis that it evaded the real issue since all mention 
Of "the positive recognition of the idea of revision" had 
been dropped* ; ihid instead|, the mention of articles 10* 16* 
and 19 of. the League Covenant Seemed to strengthen the ter­
ritorial status quo ideal "If one really wishes to accomp­
lish something which is ‘sensible not only from the German 
but also from the general European point of view* one must
' ’ t .
decide on a provisión which recognizes the existence of the 
revision problem and at the same time assures a peaceful 
treatment of it *."37
Article Ilf-of the French draft also met with similar 
German opposition as it omitted "the positive statement of 
the necessity of realizing German equality of rights*"38 
Germany pointed out that the object of the pact was not to 
confine the four Powers "to the methods and procedures actu­
ally contained in the Covenant* for if SO' there would be np
^Bocuments on German Foreign Policy^ 19l8-li5B C* I* 28I4- 
85* .
37xbld*á 286»
38ibld* * 286» :
reason for having any further document at all*" In her 
opinion "the time position. that we would respect the
provisions Of the Covenant and not go contrary to them* but 
that Jja&j&J not the same thing as limiting oúr method and 
procedure by what is already prescribed*"^9 :
:ia reply$ Bom© assured, Berlin that French article II 
was quite satisfactory since it "contained a clear recogni­
tion of the principle that the four Powers alone are.to con­
sult oh a proposal for revisión*1/ As regards article,- III* 
Mussolini agreed yith German objections and expressed.the 
need for revising lt*^°
At the same: time Italy attempted to restrain Gertnaáy, in 
her resentment of the. French text* Mussolini warned Germany 
that in,view of recent reactions to the policies of the new 
German regime (especially anti-semitic activities)* Italy 
alone stood by her side# and it was necessary for Germany to 
break her tsóiatióh«. À prompt conclusion of the pact*, v.. 
with German participation* would greatly relieve the tension., 
The contents of the pact were not important* The fact that
70*
^Documents on British Foreign' ipoliev^ 191^*39* 2* V* 169*
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Franc© had agreed to a discussion of treaty revision in the 
circle ef the four Powers Was. a great advance
Secret, negotiations continued between the German arid 
Italian governments♦ During the period April 10th to the 
l8th¿ Hitler's right hand man». Hermann Goring# and German 
Viceivhancellor yon: Papen» visited Home, The French text of 
April 11 was formally rejected by Germany* At the same time 
Goring asserted that Germany considered Mussolini's original 
text as acceptable« He assured Mussolini that for him and 
Hitler ''good relations', between Germany and Italy ^ © r © 7  not 
only a diplomatic question but ^eflectec ¡7 a profound and 
sincere CGnviction»tt^ 2
Mussolini» in turn» assured the German ministers that 
Italy too#, felt ,some changes in the French text were neees* 
sary# especially article 111*^3 But he warned them that 
anti-'semitic policy In Germany must be stopped in order to 
ease the situation*^ ■ _
Subsequently#' Germany inquired of Italy about the pos­
sibility of bringing a colonial agreement within thè
^Documents on German Foreign Policy» 19l8-l|5>» C* I» 3OO. 
^Documents, on British Foreign Policy» 1919*39¿ 2» V# 11+6
libidi b H 1.9.
I4I+ 1
Ibid»» lii.7»
framework Of the pact negotiations., as was. initially planned 
in Mus solini1 s d r a f t T h i s  new German’ demand, was* however, 
dismissed by Mussolini* He pointed out.that such discussions 
would lead tò apprehensions among the Dutch and the Portu* 
gueae* Instead he suggested that the possibility of à 
gentlemen*s ágreement between the two countries on the ques* 
tion of colonieSÿr. should be considered#^.
After attempting to.pacify German opposition, Mussolini 
emphasized to Berlin that it was necessary to encourage an 
early conclusion of the padt*. Especially because in. France 
the pro^paet poiicy stood and fell with Saladier* Hërriot, 
who in all probability would succeed as Premier* was opposed 
to the pact*^, .
Finally, on April 21 a German revision of the French 
té*t was submitted in Romeî ,
i Preamble .
Séme. as Erench.text of April 11, with thè ■ 
P&çëptîoh^pf ;the. 'phrase. <*.. while Conforming
to' thë-mëthods'úndr prócèd^è.S : whioh, are provided 
for :-there ¿-from ;’which 'they--'d© not intend.t© depart} " 
which is.deleted, ......
^Documents, on German Foreign Policy, 1910*k5* C, I, 317*18, 351_  —  . .. .




The four Powers confirm that the obligations of 
the Covenant demand scruplous respect for all treaty 
obligations as a means Of ensuring peace and secur­
ity, but they also recognize the possibility Of revi­
sion pf the peace treaties in circumstances that 
might lead to a Conflict among nations. In connec­
tion therewith and with a view to the possible 
application in Europe of thè principles enunciated 
in articles ÏG and 19 of the Covenant, they decide 
to examine among.themselves^ without prejudice,tp 
decisions which Can only be taken by the regular or­
gans of the League of Nations, any proposal tending 
to give full efficacy to these principles ?
'Article III
The High Contracting Powers undertake to collab­
orate a3 quickly as possible with the other Powers In 
a convention ensuring a substantial reduction and 
limitation of armaments», with provisions for its sub­
sequent revision with a view to a new reduction» In 
the event that the Di sarmarnent Conference should end 
with only partial results Prance» Germany* Great 
Britain» and Italy declare that the equality of 
rights accorded Germany should have an effective 
application.» Germany for her part undertakes for 
thé duration of the first'disarmament convention (5 
years; at„^  the !mqs^) to reali2e.^thls equality of 
rights only by stages and by virtue of an agreement 
reached to this effect in relation¿to the disarma­
ment of the othef.power s» (Analogous arrangements 
concerning ' Austria»- . Hungary» a n ^  Bulgaria, )
Article IV '
The High Contracting Parties affirm in general 
their desire to consult on every question of common 
Interest in Europei- particularly on every question 
concerning the restoration of its economy* -
67
■ • Article V
The present.agreement is concluded fop a period 
of 10 years reckoned from thé exchange of ratifica­
tions • If at the end of the 8th year none of the High 
Contracting Parties has notified the others of its 
Intention to'; terminate it*  it shall be considered as 
renewed and shall remain in force indefinitely*, the 
Contracting Parties retaining the right to terminate 
it by denoTihcing it 2 years in advance*
Article VI : ;■ '■
No change*^
Following the German counter-draft of April 21* a series 
of conversations were held in Home# attended by thè ambas­
sadors. of Britain* France* and Germany and the Italian Under­
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs* The new German text 
was discussed*^®
A Franco-German controversy arose in these conversations 
It was based on the German insistence that rearmament by 
stages would be acceptable only for five years* After that* 
Germany should be free to rearm* To France, and also to 
Britain and Italy this idèa appeared repugnant. On the other 
hand*.France■insisted that mention Of Austria* Hungary* and 
Bulgaria in the German draft would‘exasperate the Little 
Entente countries* She also objected to the exclusion of 
article 16 of the Covenant from the German article II* and
^Documents on German Foreign Policy* I9l6-h5>* G, I* 3llj.-
16. " " ; ; ,“T  ^  ^  . ’ ; . '
• T ft -
^ Documents on British Foreign Policy», 1919-39* 2* V* 3^ >b*
■i:;';. 68
•fC" to th© substitution of iprioóipléá* for ’tnothods orid proco*
■V; ■ dureai ixi th©;sam© àptfoi;©*^ • -
• •-. In fact Prance was, disappointed by the German' counter*
I drafts She accused Germany of trying to sabotage thO. entire 
'(fy negotiations:#^' According to Srifciah reports* f;,theGermans 
appeared to hare aroused Prench suspicions by giving the 
idea that th© Object of t¿e agreement was* in their view* to 
 ^ substltnto th© Four-Power Pact for the teague of Nations and 
to side-track the latter over questions of revision and dia- 
armaments •
As a possible measure to solve the Franc o*Ge m a n  con­
flict, an unsuccessful attempt was launched by the four 
Powers to encourage the coñeinsion of a pact of Mutual Assist- 
ano© between Frahce and Germany«'^
Finally* on May Xg a new draft was drawn up in Home by 
the representatives of the four Powers and Submitted to the 
various governments for approval* This draft omitted all
reference to British Msáríaament Gonvéntion in article 111
' - ■'.. • • . " . • ...-.V ; ,
^Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919-32» 2# V, 3 % -
6S¿ V'i ; '/-V /
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and In article II no mention was made of either the »prin­
ciples * or the »methods and procedures * relating to the revi­
sion of' treaties»; Basically this draft was only a slight
amendment of the French text ^
On May I4. Germany retórtéd with another cóunter-dráít»
And at the same time requested of Mussolini that article 16 
of the Covenant must not bementioned in article II of the 
pact* . ■»»Since. it ’has nothing at ‘ ail’ to do with the entire com­
plexion of questions here at issue.,T^
The May ij. German counter-draft merely amended articles 
II and III, as follows: H
■ : Article II
The, High i^óntracting parties* with a view to 
the applicatieh^ in Bnrope Of/articles lOvf 16^ arid 
19 Concerhin# tOrhitohial integrity9 sanctions* and 
the reconsideration of treaties* decide to examine 
among themselves*; v/ithOut prejudice to the decisions 
which can only ’bo taken by the regular organs Of 
the League of Nations* any proposal tending.to give 
full efficacy to the Above-mentioned articles*
• Article III• - ■ • 1 r * t
The HighContractlngParties recognizebbat 
the maintenance of peace makes necessary the reduc­
tion of national armaments to the minimum compatible 
with national security and that the success' of the 
' Disarmament Conference will be the best means of
"^ Documents on British Foreign Policy» 19l9?19i. 2* V* 366*
^Documents on German Foreign Policy. 19l6-i¡5» 0* I* 377» 
(Also 377 h? 3)«
realising this objective* They renew their desire 
to cooperate with the other Towers represented there 
in this effort to work out as quickly as possible a 
.convention assuring a substantial reduction:and a 
limitation of arparaents. with provision for its- sub- • 
sequent revision with a view to new reductions* :
. France,'' Great Britain, and Italy on their papt 
declare that the' principle of equality of rights:; '
, : must have* a practical value for. Germany, and Ger*
. many* in What concerns herf Undertakes to reálité 
: this; principle of equality Of rights p'nly by virtu©
of an accord to be concluded on the general basis 
of the recent British draft convention* to which 
- each of the four Powers will be a party* The four 
Bowers recognize that'these same principles apply 
to the other states disarmed by treaty,55
France Opposed thè German draft of May ij.* saying that
retention of article 16 of the Covenant was most important
in her opinión* 7 Also, sheobjeeted to the exclusion of
"methods and procedures” from- article II* and the passage
relating to "stages" from article III and the substitution
therein of "accord” for "accords." At the same timé France
professed her desire to obtain an early conclusion of the
■Four Power Pact. She felt- more favorably inclined, to the
Home, text ôf May 1,-^’ „
Italy was disgusted with the German counter proposals
of May ij., She felt "that the German demand that stages be
j ' r
fixed with respect tp equality of rights'by :means of an
■ ^Documents on German Foreign. Policy» 1 9 1 8 C, I* 377~
78,
^Documents ón 'BritishForelgn Policy* 1919-39* 2* V, 2Ó5- 
66* ; '
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agreement, prior to ratification of the pact# would irre* 
trievably ^recK the hegptiationa for the pact * she 
requested that the German government should refrain from con~ 
veying '.the ..prOposals ..to Paris and London#, "in view' of the. 
dangerous reaction that could be expected in England and
' ». V. -
France * * ¿"b® However# the German draft, was presented in 
London and Britain expressed the view that'• she • '"quite.i.appre^ ; 
elated 6uT ^ermanyt^7 accomodating attitudes v$9
Meanwhile Italy and Britain continued their policy of 
collaboration, Britain expressed her general approval of 
the Rome text of May 1 provided some minor adjustments were 
effected# It was fe lt  that' an early conclusion of the Four* 
Power Pact was imperative in view of the imminent failure 
of the Disarmament, C-onference# and the worsening European 
situation* On May 9 and May 16# Italy approached Britain 
to help speed up the negotiations and during the same period 
London emphasized the need.for early conclusion of the pact
¿a
to the authorities, in Paris
^^Document3 on German Foreign Policy# 1918*it.5» C, I# JL4.II4-•
^8Ibld.. 144 n#.. 3 \
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There was indeed enough cause for AnglófItalian Anxiety 
regarding a speedy and successful conclusion';of^^:;the'• pact 
negotiations » The political atmosphere: in Europe, had 'grown 
increasingly tense since the,, end of Màrchp;.;Ì9Ì3.» -Various 
factors were responsible for the aggravation of/;V^ V;:'S'itu'e.t-.l©n-i!
Thè course of events in Germany was not bypassed by any 
of the leading European statesmen though among British gov­
ernment the opinion prevailed that Germany could be contained 
by concessions; and agreements rather than by recourse to war*: 
Thé British anxiety wag well expressed' by MacDonald on April 
13* ¡when he admitted that "sometimes I am almost driven" 
into the "une omfor table position*1 that "it is no usé talking 
about disarming by agreement# it is no use talking: about : 
pacts* it is no use talking about cooperation for peace 
unless you have had some experience which justifies yoü in 
accepting the word of those with whom you are to cooperate. "^1 
Basically* however# Britain remained enthusiastic about the 
Pour-Power ' Pact
The most important attack on the policy of appeasing 
Germany came from Sir Austen Chamberlain* former Foreign, 
Secretary* Speaking in the House, of Commons oh April 13 
he declared*
6l • ' . .
Toynbee (ed*) *. Survey of International Affairs, 1933* 
I69*. Also see House of Commonsa Parli amontary PebatesTsth 
Ser*.* Voi. 2 7 6 9. p* 26iij,»22* " '
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What is ¿asairig' |h #e^mahy seems to mé’ to render 
this a singularly inopportunemoroent to talk about 
thé revision of treaties *. ■* »
What is this new spirit of German nationalism?
The worst of the old-Prussian Imperialisms with an 
added savagery* a racial pride « ; •: *, Are: you go­
ing to discuss revision, with a Go,Vefniaent like that?
Are you going to discuss with such a Government the 
Polish Corridor1? Thé Polish Corridor is inhabited 
by Poles! do you dare to put another pole under the 
heel of such a Government,?
That is not a Germany to which we can- afford 
to make: concessions * That Is not a Germany to*« . 
which Europe can. afford to give equality, • * *■ '■
The Çhambëriâih speech received supportand publicity 
in the French and the Little Entente press* as it expressed 
tjfcielr views adequately* But the opposite views also 
gained strength at this time, Mussolini wrote on April 10 
that, "The Revisionist idea is on the march* and no fragile 
bulwark of a : protocol can arrest it The British Foreign
Secretary expressed a similar view when he said that the 
question of frontier revision could not be disposed of by 
refusing to mention it for ; in certain quarters revisionism 
was very much in p e o p l e m i n d s
62
House of Commons® Parliamentary Debates* 5th Ser»» Vol*
276, p * 2758-59* ..-■ -.¿jl
^ T h e  Times (London)* April 15* 1933* P* 9*
^Do:c\imehts on British Porelffn Policy* 191<?-3ft* 2* V*
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fhe kittle Entente opposition to the Fotu^Power Pact’ .
continued unabated# Gn April 25* Dr* Benes.| Speaking la
■'the Gseoh Parliament* strongly denouncedthe lueaollni pro*
■posai and accused Italy of conniving to create a newbalance
of powor in Europe in order to destroy tfce infiuence bf
France and her allies«; He remarked:
'r/v. 1 She big nations must realise ' that in the ■ 
future , thdy must not seek to satisfy their- ambi* 
tlons andpolltical and economic alma dverthe 
: ^ heads/'Of. ihe/hmcil countries* making them instru#
' mehta. of • polity-* It; should not be • forgotten that 
most of the wars of last century resulted directly
■ from,\that'kind :0f policy^;-a policy-that'-tehid'he
• Impossible-how * * * * It must be emphasised that 
.the. hit tie ••-Entente, will not admit the division ..of 
Europe lnto *spheres' of influence**c6
. Dr*. Benes 'also'' defined- the ■ attitude' of the hit tie' Entente 
on the question of treatyrevision as proposed by the Masso# 
iini\-pl:ah:f':-BiU- terms' that‘''-were precise and .uncompromising ”4'
While discussing thisquestion at Geneva with •'"
Sir John Simon ■ was compelled to remind hiia that 
frontier adjustments cannot be imposed upon any 
state and that any one attempting anything of the 
" sort with GaeChosiovakia would have to march an 
v army intoher territory* We should know how to 
defend ourselves*,' ; It was- possible 'to'dispose..of
■ ■ ’-■territory at the Peace Conference* Since;;the
momentwheh ownership was confirmed in law to this 
or that state it is perfectly absurd to Claim any
see
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right of disposition* îhôt is our position in 
• principie, and we will not depart,from it for any 
one* We cannot understand how a combination Of 
states Canbe formed to divide, the territory of 
other states when-*if I am rightly informed--all 
questions as to their own territory are to be 
excluded oh the ground that no agreement could be 
reached about. them v »• -, *■’ '
■ Frontier'alterations are only possible by 
direct agreement between the states concerned with* 
in the ¿.framework of Article 19 of thé League ' Cov­
enant? ' •
The laçk of any progress in the Disarmament Conference 
also encouraged.fears and suspicions among European nations* 
Early in April Mussolini expressed the view that an adjourn»* 
ment of the conference would be helpful as It would give 
time for successful conclusion of the pact negotiations*
And once the pact was concluded there would be greater pos** 
sibillty of achieving disarmament*0' . ,
Later ihi A|^ii (April MacDonald yisited thé
United: States with the specific, a of trying to secure 
American support for the British Disarmament Convention* 
Britain was indeedanxious^Oobtaln such support ás it 
would also help the pact, negotiations»^
^Toynbee (eda)a Survev of International Affairs* 1933s
.6» v / v 1;-
AA • ; •
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But the endless conflict over German insistence on 
equality of rights and the increasing French demands for 
security (as a result Of the*policies of the new German 
regime) seemed to discourage all hopes Of a conclusion of 
the Disarmament Conference;, Towards the-end of April* Italy 
expressed her anxiety andresentraent over thè German ihtrah% 
sigenee, She endeavored to work with Britain to obtain
acceptance of the British Convention, The United States and 
France were also inclined favorably towards the British Dis* 
armament plan; Germany*, however* consistently maintained 
her opposition to the crucial questions concerning overseas 
troops and the standardization of Continental armies. Thé 
situation at Geneva was well explained by the British dele* 
gate* Anthony Eden*: in a memorandum dated May 3# 1933? ”We 
had hoped that the presentation Of a Draft Convention would 
result in a different atmosphere for discussion at Confer­
ence and might encourage mutuai concessions,. I am bound to 
confess that I cannot detect any fundamental change« For 
this the present situation in Germany is no doubt in part 
responsible,^1 Eden. draphasized that the various delegations 
were consequently nervous, In his view the Disarmament
7QPocuroenta on British Foreign Policy, 1919*19* 2, V* 176*
Conference was bound to fall if Germany did not change her 
stubborn attitude
In factj anxiety about the worsening situation in Europe 
increased around thi$ time . 72 The fear of German rearmament 
was well expressed'by one of the British delegates at Geneva : 
"There is a mad' dog abroad once more and we must resolutely ' 
combine 'either tè; ensure, its destruction or at least its con­
finement until the hi has run its course«"73
Meanwhilej Gerinany, felt concerned about her own isola­
tion* 'On May Hitler made conciliatory déclarations towards 
Poland and the Four*Power Pact *7ll- ¿nd during the period*
May 5-lbt Alfred ROsenberg* Hitler*s lieutenant in foreign 
affairs* paid a visit to London in an effort to calm British 
fears'* This visit ^ prèvéd to be a failure *75 German diplo­
macy attempted to create, good feeling in Britain towards the 
new regime* The successful result of this is shown in the
^Documents oh British Foreign Policy* 1919-39. 2# V* 190* 
?2Ibld«W 217*
73ibid** -217*
7^ibid*j 219* Regarding conciliatory approaches to Poland 
see documents on German Foreign Policy*: i9l8-li5, C„ 1» 366-67<»
' ^ Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919-39* 2# V* 20lj- 
05, 212-13« 228-10* li3 3i Documents' on German Foreign Policy*. > 
1918^ 5 *  C. I* liQli-05» k33*
report Of fchô British ambaagador in Berlin* who stated after 
: a conversation with Hitler that he was- convinced thé Führer 
was lftperfectiÿ' ^incere,, in his conviction that Germany must 
remain, on good terms with Britain«^
Thefearsaroused byGerman rearmament continued unabated* 
On May 11* Viscount Baiiahami British Secretary for War*
, warned. Germany that if she persisted in her attaints at rearm* 
lag or withdrew from the disarmament Conference Britain would 
regard this as a breach of treaty of Versailles and sanctions 
would be imposed, against her<J7 similarly on May 12* Paul« 
gone our warned Germany that if the disarmament Conference 
failed the peace treaties would continue to be applied* It 
was evident that franco would apply military sanctions against 
Germany in cooperation with Britain and Belgium*^® in Poland 
and the Little Entente, countries the; talk O f ‘preventive war 
against Germany gained momentum during May, 1933*^ îher© 
was increased.anxiety in Britain and Italy about the fate of 
the disarmament Conference and Its effects On. the chances of 
feur*POw®r coopérâtIon*®® \ -
^Documents on British foreign. Policy» Ì9Ì9»3fl.a ’ 2»-- V* 23h*
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H i t l e r # felt concerned about the deterioration 
of the situation,* :An emergency cabinet meeting was convened 
In Berlin On May 12 * However* Hitler was not prepared to 
concede Germanyis vital interests* He told his cabinet:
“The disarmament question will not be solved at 'tbè confer* 
enee table There is no historical instance where a victor 
accorded arms to the vanquished through negotiations*“ And 
he assured his ministers that if any sanctions were imposed 
against Germany by France and Britain she would declare the 
Treaty of Versàilles as torn* A
But Germany did malce an attempt to allay fears and anxi* 
eties in France and other European countries * On May 17* 
in a speech in the Reichstag» Hitler declared^ “Germany’*e‘ 
only wish is to be able to preserve her independence and 
protect her frontiers*“®2 At the same time* he once again 
commended the Four-Power Pact . Hitler *a^speech was received 
with satisfaction in Italy* $$ille in' Prance, it had a mixed 
reception varying between satisfaction and scepticism*®^
: Documents ^-on .■ GermànaForeign Policy* 1918*115« C,: 1*
. ftO ■' ■ . : . .
Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1019*39a 2$ V» 
2^2*56;' The ' Times (London) # &ey 19# 1933» p'«‘ 14»
®^Docuraents on .German. Foreign Policy«' 19l8*lt.5* Op t$
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juncture*appealed tp Britain to . 
use hep influence In speeding up the pact negotiations*
The French government was at this time having great diffi­
culties with the Little Entente countries and Poland as well 
as with the Parliament} in fact its life was in danger#
The British ambassador in Rome explained the situation wells
There was every reason to hasten on the initial­
ling of the pact* as about this time it was thought 
that a ministerial crisis was Imminent: in Prance# 
and there appeared to be something approaching an 
opOn rhpture between' M. Daladier and BjU Herrlot.
Signor Mussolini was accordingly anxious to clinch 
the negotiations and initial the.agreement within 
the next few daysat Geneva# where the Foreign Min­
isters of the .Powers concerned were■-•meeting#. Every* 
one was agreed on the good results which would 
accrue should it be found possible to conclude the 
agreement before the meeting of the Economic Con­
ference on the 12th June# and also* it might be. ; 
added* before debt payments were due to America on 
the 15th Juiie. " - '
The British government .was also anxious about the situ­
ation, Sir John Simon instructed ambassador Graham in Rome* 
on May 17* that "in view ofthe existing state of tension 
arising from the acts of Nazi Government in Germany# to 
inform the Italian Government, of the importance which 
^ritain7’attached to the early conclusion of a Four-Power 
Agreement,“^  At the same time# Britain and Italy continued
^Documents on British Foreign Policy* lftl9*39* 2* V# 266
368,
85
Ibid*, 3665 information regarding British anxiety is 
also found on p. 26I4.*
fio insi at ôà tiiêir objection to the mention of article
. Q it
of the League Covenant in article II of the draft pact»ou 
Some measure of success was achieved in the pact nego­
tiations conducted by the representatives Of the four Powers 
in Rome ♦ On May 18* agreement was reached on all' points 
except on the question of tibie mention of article 16 of the 
Iieague Covenant*. France stubbornly insisted on retaining; 
this article in thè pact draft* whilé' Sritaih and Italy were 
opposed to it* Germany was still dissatisfied with’article 
III»8^ Britain approached France and urged upon her the 
âçute need for an early conclusion of the pact even at the 
cost of concessions on all sides*; in view of the European
; OO
situation*0 Finally* on May 19* Franòe submitted another 
draft In Rome in which she still insisted on the mention of 
article 16 and oh thé Inclusion of the phrase "methods and 
p r o c e d u r e s . i t  was evident that Germany would reject 
the new French text as article III was.still unsatisfactory
86 1
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in her opinion* .. Germany also insisted that the pact should 
be applicable only for five years arid npttten»?®
The pact negotiations had reached a state of deadlock* 
It was obvious that Prance and Germany were more concerned 
about their own -respective Interests than in making sacri» 
flees in order to obtain a compromise text of the Four**
Power Pact * The worsening ¡European situât ion# resulting 
from the activities Of the Nazis in Germany* tnade it 
increasingly difficult to forge ahead with a formal plan for 
four-Power collaboration* It was evident that unless Ger­
many made, cohcb a with a View to allaying fears* the
situation would become untenable* The Four-Power Pact had
already undergone a process of dilution* which was encouraged 
by the anxiety •arising from the belief that, an early conclu­
sion of the pact would help ease the situation* Britain and 
Italy continued,, their efforts to bring pressure to bear on 
Paris and Berlin to avoid a complete failure of the pact dis­
cussions*
Documents oh Qerman Foreign ' Policya 






- . THE CRGCJAB, STAGE %
The FpancorGerraah coriiipiipt iM the Pour*Pbwer^ nego­
tiations ¿ad fan^peaching consequences* Not only did it con­
tribute to the, deadibcli of #ay 19^20* but the fate of the 
entire text was" decided, by this conflict* POP France and 
Germany* the pact had greater significance than it did for 
Britain and Xtalyi in as much as it affected .their immediate 
interests'* To France it implied the weakening of her satel­
lite system without any corresponding,arrangement for con* 
taining Germany* By the same-token it represented, a gain 
for Germany* But it was not politically expedient for 
France to reject, the Mussolini plan* Consequently she was 
determined, to .render it hapmXeas* - ,
Germany was.anxious to solve the deadlock in the nego­
tiations* An early conclusion of the pact would contribute 
to easing tensions in Europe and thereby save Germany from 
isolation. Mussolini consistently appealed to Hitler to make 
concessions, on article Illf1 Consequently* on May 19* Goring 
paid his second visit to Rome*
^Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919*39» 2* V* 366«
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The French text of May 19 was discussed by Mussolini 
and Goring on thè morning of May 20* The same afternoon* 
the British and, French ambassadors held further consultations 
With-,Mussolini* The upshot of these hastily convened con­
ferences was that a new text of article III was drawn up*
This new draft, of article III ended with a concluding sentence 
that was "studiously vague and contained no mention of actual 
agreements betweed the .-.f'bur.'regarding the realization 
of equality of rights, " 2 ■
In a dramaticmoveto-imprové the situation Goring pub­
licly accepted the latest text of articles II and III as 
well as the idea of a ten-year pact* He pointed out ;that*
"The advantage was that through the treaty we had to deal 
only with a small body of four, and in this Mussolini had 
promised us. his support at all times * Indeed Goring*s 
visit to Home created a salutory effect* Graham wrote to 
London in commendatory tones* rtI learnt subsequently that 
Herr Goring on this visit was in a conciliatory mood and 
that * * we might have been able to obtain all we wished 
out of Herr Goring at that time and thus have hastened mater­
ially the conclusion of the pact,
^Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919*3?, 2, V* 367«
^Ibid** 367J also see Documents on German Foreign Policy» 
1918-StTC* I*-l+79.
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The Mussolini *Goring conversations* however* reveal 
that Germany’s attitude had not changed much. Goring accepted 
the new Italian article III only under protesti He wanted 
article III to contain the phrases ’’France* Great Britain# 
and'Italy declare that the principle of rights recognized, in 
the resolution of December 11# 1932, must have a practical 
value for Germany . . . Italy insisted that the phrase 
should read: ’’declare that the principle of equality such as 
was recognized by the resolution * , * . Goring also in­
sisted that a protocol be appended to the Four-Power Pact 
stating that the Powers must meet four weeks after the signa­
ture of the pact and decide on the first stage of disarma­
ment,^ Mussolini rejected this German demand*^ Germany alào 
persisted in her objection to article II of the French text 
of May 19., which replaced "principles" by "methods and pro­
cedures?1 relating to treaty revision.®
On May 21 a new compromise text of thè Four-Power Pact 
was drafted in Koine, The r Opre senta ti ve s of the four Powers 
agreed to the insertion of the phrase ’methods and procedures”
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as against "principles” in article II* Germany and Italy 
also tentatively withdrew their opposition to the mention 
of article 16 of the League Covenant in article IXI* An 
additional reference to security was also included in.this, 
article. Article XV of the pact was dropped, The May 21 
draft represented quick progress in the pact diâeuseiensi 
Graham reported from Romei "These satisfactory results had 
only beeh obtained as a result of the consistently concilia­
tory attitude followed by the Italians and by the amount of 
pressuré which they had.brought to bear in Berlin,"9 The 
new Compromise text was generally acceptable to the four 
Powers, However, Britain expressed dissatisfaction with the 
inclusion of article 16 of the League Covenant, and the mat» 
ter came tinder review between London and Paris Germany, 
too, was not entirely satisfied, Hitler expressed the view, 
that the Mussolini pact should be agreed to only after the 
Disarmament Conference had either broken up or produced a 
re shit totally inadequate for Germany*. .
The pact negotiations progressed successfully after - 
May .21* On May 26 a new draft of 'article IV was presented in
^Documents oh British Foreign Policy, 1919-39» 2, V, 368,
276. -, . ' ‘ " ■ : ; .
^Documents on German Foreign Policy» 19l8-li5, C, I, k9b*
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Rome by France* and was accepted by the four Powers'1' (same 
as final text of article IV)* On the same day* Britain
accepted the inclusion of article lo to help the process of 
"European appeasement She presented, an amended draft of 
article II (same, as final text of article II), France 
objected, to the phrase in this article: "to give due effect
to these articles,", She- demanded a translation of the word 
"due," This Caused some.difficulty but France eventually
gave In*. .
Germany* on the other hand, adopted a stubborn attitude* 
and declared the new.text of article II to be unacceptable, .
Von Neurath complained that "the whole character of the pact 
had been .changed and it was now scarcely worth anything to 
Germany* ,
Italy tried to bring pressure to bear upon Germany in 
an attempt to conclude the negotiations without further delay 
Cerruti approached the German Foreign Office on May 20* say* 
ing that the Italian government was "unable to comprehend * « 
the attitude which the Government of the Reich ^ ^Wd/ assumed 
in the last few days*, an attitude which* at the. present stage
12
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of the * constitutes the sole obstacle to the
It He, further emphasized that the,
Italian government -"continues to consider it not only expédia 
eht but also necessary to reach a conclusion of the pact*
above all in view of the probable failure of the Disarmar
• „ 1 5  V
ment Conference*".
The following day Hitler retorted with fresh demands-«
He asked Mussolini to "give an authentic statement Of his 
view of the significance of thé words* . such as was recog­
nised* 1 ^in article Ij7  bn which our decision on whether to 
• 1 1 
accept this wording would depend*" Hé also asked Mussolini
to "declare himself willing after the initialing of.the pact 
and not later than the time of the .signing to define for us 
thé exact details of the procedure for the practical implement 
tation of the equality of rights*"^
On May 10, in a secret message to Hitler* Mussolini 
asked him not to stand obstinately on his objections to arti­
cle II* This might isolate Germany* since the pact negôtia-v 
tlons had reached a conclusive stage* Mussolini declared:
"In Pari3 the parliamentary situation was so unstable that 
even a delay of only a ■ few days tiiight Jeoporcjize the entire
^Documents oh German Foreign Policy* l9l8-ij,S* C* I, 496« ,
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agreement• Conclusion of the pact would improve, and strength* 
en Germany’s position*"^7
Bidssolini also advised Hitler that a declaration regard* 
ing Implementation of equality of rights would be unwise 
•’now*" He suggested that such a protocol could be appended 
to the Four-Power Pact after its signature* An insistence 
On the four Powers declaring in a protocol their plans for 
the first stage of disarmament "would bring about a discus* 
sión of ail the problems of disarmament and equality Of 
rights* the treatment of which* if limited to the four Powers* 
could take place in an atmosphere much more favorable to 
Germany *
The Ducè concluded his message by warning Hitler that 
the failure of the pact "would benefit only those circles 
that were working for a preventivo war or were threatening 
the new regime in Germany in some, other way or that wanted
' • - . ' > i . .
to unite against Germany*1 At the same time he emphasized 
that thè important consideration in the question of the 
Pour-Power Pact "was to create a period Of calm which would 
enable Germany to solve the difficult problems;of domestic 
politics undisturbed
^Documents on German Foreign Policy* 19l84tj?» C* I* $0k• 
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. While Italy wag thus trying to secure German concurrence 
a fresh controversy arose in the pact negotiations«; On May 
28 thé French newspaper Le Matin published a report concern*
i; ing the guarantee that France Intended to give to her allies 
in order to allay their fears regarding thé Four^-Power PàCt.^0 
' Germany immediately protested at the French "guarantee prot* 
OcolB as it implied a unilateral interprétation of the pact‘i • - • • . ‘■ :• ■ . . *• .. .
: by France ahd restricted its scope« Von Neurathcornplained>
uIt goes without saying that such parallel agreements between 
France'and her allies as wè have already experienced in pre~ 
vious settlements especially liOcarno^ would not only nullify 
the political and practical significence of article II Of 
, the Rome pact.but transform it into the Opposite*
In reply France máde-an official assurance in Rome that 
the Le Matin report was exaggerated and incorrect* The French 
'‘guarantee protocol” would merely assure her allies that no 
treaty: revision would be imposed on them except through the 
"principle of unanimity” in the League of Hâtions* In that 
sense the French: interpretation was similar to the Italian 
Interpretation* This formal rejection of the Le Matin arti» 
ele by France satisfied Germany*^
• ' 1 ■, t'.1 ' *<
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Britain too expressed her concern about the French 
"guarantee prpt bcol|" . "as deliberately diminishing,the value 
of the pact *  1,23 France in turn assured Britain that her 
treaties with Poland, Czechoslovakia* Rumania and Yugoslavia 
committed her to "consult with these powers, before conelud- 
ingf new agreements'that affected policy in Central Europe*
. 2k .
etc*" ^ At the .same time,, she emphasized that a guarantee 
was indispensable as "nothing less would satisfy the Little 
Entente and* until the Little Entente had declared that 
their anxiety wàs allayed, no French Parliament would allow 
France to become a party"^ to the pact.
After this poiitroversy was settled, the latest Rome ver­
sion of the Four^Pôwèr Pact was submitted to the .jurists of 
the various governments in Geneva on May 29. The jurists
• • 'j „ ' " x
examined the.text and recommended that the text should be 
translated into all four languages*^
The pact discussions were nearing conclusion on May 30* 
Hitler formally accepted; the., latest text*^T At the same
^Documents on British Foreign Policy. 19i9-39. 2, V, 281*
p). ' . .'.-. . ,
^ Documents oh.German Foreign Policy, I9l8*k5* C, I, 555»
^Documentsori British Foreign Policy* 1919•»39* 2. V, 281*
• Ibid«* 369; Also see/documents on German Foreign Policy. 
1918-klr'C* .1 , 502 n*> ■ .....
27Documents oh German Foreign Policy* C, I,
time« the Little Entente .Council in Geneva-issued a statement 
accepting the pactin accordance with thé French assurance 
that the "principle of unanimitywould be applied in the 
event of frontier revision. The Little Entente Council 
expressed satisfaction that the original version of the pact«
. which,violated the principles of international law and the,
rights'of other nations« had been abandoned' and a milder
oft ■ •
text adopted.* ' .
An unexpected crisis arose in the pact negotiations at 
this stage i On June 1« France suddenly rerjected article III . 
of the Italian draft of May 21* It was explained that a mis- 
understanding had' océured between the French embassy in Rome 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris.. The author­
ities in Paris had been dealing With the French text of 
May 19 as the basis for their conversations with the Little 
Entente powers# On the other hand« Britain« Italy and Ger­
many had based' their negotiations on the Italian text of 
May 21. The Crucial, difference in the Rome and Pari3 texts 
lay in the : wording in the concluding part of article III #
The French text suggested that the Little Entente countries ‘ 
would be consulted in any rearmament measures for Austria«
oft
Wheelèr-Bennett,«, Documents-, on International - Affairs.
1911# 261-63, See also Ministér^dés Affaires ’Etrangères«
Pact d 1 entente et da Collaboration. (Paris« 1933)s (Here­
after”re'FeVred" to as the French Blue BoOk)« 19-20#
Hungary and Bulgaria* while the Rome text emphasized that 
rearmament would be regulated by agreement only between the 
' iOUr'BowbrSi’2^ 'i ■ i'’- . ’ *’
This last minute obstacle seemed to destroy all hopes 
of an early conclusion of. the'pact* Italy asked France to 
accept the pact asagreed in order that it could be initialled 
: without delay* Mussolini suggested that in his speech* after 
initialling of the pact, he would give it an interpretation 
which would meet with the French point of view* France 
expressed her willingness to. except this offer on the;’ condì« 
tiOn that Britain too would consent to give a similar inter­
pretation*
Britain rejected the French demand* She had made con­
cessions to France over the question of the inclusion of 
article 1.6 óf the League Covenant in the pact and insisted 
that France in turn should at least concede to accepting the 
Rome text which was; acceptable to the other three Powers* 
Britain Warned France that if the pact failed France would 
be held responsible for the consequences,-^
A mood of failure prevailed.in Rome on June 2* A series 
of hurried conferences were held among the representatives
^Documents on British Foreign Policy* 1919^19* 2* V*, 309* 
See, also Documents on German Foreign Policy» 191o^h5« C* I*
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of the four Powers* Ambassador do Jouvenel anxiously con­
tacted DaXadier*'^ À, strong feeling developed that the so* 
'oaììod fiisundèrétanding between Paris and the French embassy 
in Rome.was deliberate and thát France was-trying to sabo­
tage 'the jpact negotiationsA. sense of hostility and 
constraint , developed among the four Rower representatives#; 
replacing the ;'cordial relations that had existed in the course 
of ■ the ,negotiations^- Germany-felt that' *thé Paris Governmeht 
desire^, the .pact to fall because it otherwise J c o t a
it very probable that the Cabinet, ^ Quld/' fall on the; pact 
.issue
.'= Attempts were continued to break the deadlock and a com- 
promise was finally worked out by June This new version 
of article ill proved to be an excellent compromise because 
by ignoring the question of ’’equality of rights” it had a 
.favorable- impact on French opinion and by ignoring the quest 
tion of the exercise of controls on Geraan rearmament it 
tended to pacify Germany* In essence almost all French
-^ -Documents on German Forelgn Fólle Vi 19l8-li5. C, I# 515*
^Fórelgn Relations of thè United States. 1933* 1$.: ¿P-5? 
Documenta on Brltlah Forelgn Pòlieyj 1919-39* 2, V* 371j and
The Times on) i- June 7* 1933» P » 12*
33,Documents bn British Foreign Policy» 1919-39* 2» V* 371*
ocuments oh German Foreign Policy» 1918+kß* C, Is 527*
li.- n F  2 f
de.iriands .Md been accepted, thus ..making vit' tonally impossible 
■ for France to reject the pact#
Germany, however, >accepted the new draft with great 
reluctance, She pointed out: . ’’what was being put before 
us gu>ir;'W&s. 'an; entirei^ -i®Erir -pact *_ * * of Muiboffiihi’s orig- . 
Inal proposal only a weakened-version of article I was left. 
The word ’revision?' had been struck -from article II, which 
was npw more over burdened witlv a-rt-icied- .10-*aiid l6* H In 
her opinion ’the positive feature of the Borne pact until 
the end of last week had been the recognition of Germany’s 
equality of rights in article III* Now this was also 
gone * » • ♦" Germany was, however* conscious of the advan­
tages of adhering to the pact. As Von Neurath explained: 
’"Regard for the hondon ^ conomi^ Conference and for world 
opinion'were factors in favor Of signing the new pact « * . 
^though7 the prospects offered py the pact were very, unsatis* 
factoryli’^ ^ Wasdlini made another appeal to Berlin on
June 6 to accept the latest text*.3 7' ' * ' *' •
Finally, on June 6 the pact negotiations were concluded, 
and the four Powers accepted the latest draft * The Four-Power 
Pact was initialled in Rome on June 7,: The final text reveals
^Documents on German Foreign Policy, 19l8-il5« C, I,- 525»> 
37Ibld,« 527*






• The President of the German Peich'^ th© fresi^- 
dent of the ’Fi«rich- Republic* -His' Majesty the King 
of Great Britain,'! Ireland and the British Dominions 
;beyond. the .’Seas^ -^inperor of India» and His Ma jesty 
the King of Italy; • '•
Conscious of the special responsibilities 
incumbent On them as .possessing permanent repre-. 
sdntation on the Council of the League of HatIons* , 
where the teague itself and its members are con­
cerned, and of the' responsibilities resulting from 
their common signature of the Locarno agreementsj;
Convinced that the State of disquiet which ; 
obtains throughout the" world can only be dissipated 
;by;relhfhhCing'their solidarity In such a way as to 
strengthen confidence in peace in Europe}
> Faithful to the. obligations which they have 
assumed'in virtue of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations* the Locarno tre;atiesvand the Briand- 
Keilogg Pact*, and taking into account the deClap*
: :*fci'o.h, 'Of rth© ''rehunoihtion of force* the principle , 
of which was proclaimed in the Declaration signed 
, at Geneva on the 11th December* 1932» by their 
delegates at . the Disarmament. Conference and. adopted 
on the 2nd March* 1933* by the Political Commission 
of that Conference; 1
Anxious to give full effect to all the provi­
sions of the Covenant of the League of Nations* .- 
while conforming to, the methods and procedure laid 
down therein*; from which they 3^Ve no; intention of
Mindful of the right a of every State*4i,which 
cannot be affhcté^iwl^hout the consentvlif’vthe inter­
ested party; ' ' ' J
-, Have• resolved to conclude an agreement with 
these objects* and have appointed- as thòir plénir
s: . 9 •* ■ '
^Article I
The High Contracting Parties will consult to­
gether as regards all questions which appertain to 
them* They undertake to make ,every effort to pursue*
within the framework of the League of Nations* a 
policy of effective co-operation between all Powers 
with a view to/the maintenance of peace*
; Article II
In respect of the Covenant of the League of: 
Nâtionsÿ and particularly Articles 10* 16, and 19» 
thè High'Contracting Parties décidé to examine 
between themselves, and without prejudice to deci- 
. - alone Which : c a n ‘only be taken.by thé regular organs 
of the League of Nations*: all proposals relating 
to methods and procedure calculated to give due 
effect to thés.e.. .articlea*
'. ■ / Article- III
The High Contracting Parties undertake to make . 
every effort td ensure the success of the. Disarma^ 
ment Conference and* should questions which parti­
cularly concern them'-remain in suspense on the con­
clusion of that’ Conference* they' reserve the right 
. to re-examine these questions between themselves 
in pursuance of the present agreement with a view to 
ensuring their s;olution through the appropriate 
channels*.
■■ : Article IV
The High Contracting Parties affirm their 
desire to consult together- as regards all economic 
questions which have a common interest for Europe 
.and particularly for its economic restoration, 
with a view to seeking-a Settlement within the 
framework of the L©aguo of hat i ons*
Article V f ’
The present agreement is concluded for a period 
of ten years from the. date of its entry, into; force:*
‘ If,, before the end of, the eighth year, none of 
the High Contracting Parties, shall Kayé notified to 
the others his .intention to terminate \the agreement:!, 
it shall be regarded as renewed and will remain in 
force- indefinitely! each of the High Contracting 
Parties possessing in that event the right to term­
inate it-by à declaration to that-effect on giving 
two years i notice*: .
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Article VI
ihe. présent agreement, .drawn‘Up In , English*
French* German and Italian; of which the French 
text prevails In case of.divergence* shall be 
ratified arid the ratifications shall be deposited 
at Rome as sopn. as possible. The- Government of • 
the Kingdom; of Italy will deliver to. each of the '
High Contracting Partiesia certified copy of the' 
proces-verbaux of deposit * .
. The present agreement will enter into force 
as, soon as ail the ratifications have been deposited;
It .shall be registered at the League of. Nations 
in. conformity; with the Gévehant of. the beaguev ; ,
■ { x Done at Rome* the 7th June 1933* In a single 
copyj. which will remain, deposited in the archives of 
.,. thé Government: of the Kingdom of Italy;’Certified 
copies will be delivered, to each of the High Con­
tracting Parties;. . _ ' • ' •••’..» . ’
In faith whereof thé above-mentioned pleni­
potentiaries. have signed the'present agreement ¿3°
Ulrich von Hassell Sir Ronald Graham
Henri de Jouvenel Cavalière Benito Mussolini
After thé pact was initialled a new Franc©»German con­
flict arose and the pact Could not be formally signed till 
July 15♦- ‘ '
.On June 7j> an of ficIaV’Blùe Book! was released in Paris* 
and it contained a. full account of the French ’’guarantee 
protocol” made to Poland and the bit tie. Entente countries*
The contents of the protocol caused extreme surprise In
Berlin*. It how became evident that the De Matin report of
May 28 was essentially correct. France* on the other hand*
38
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had formally rejected the Le Matin report¿.prior to. June 7* 
The ’’guarantee protocol" contained a unilateral French inter*» 
pretation that the pact "precludes the examination of the 
principle of, revision and-, of concrete cases of application."
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'Iti’, .however, made possible the examination of suggestions
; ’ _ , • ’ ' / ' \  ^-V '
for.proper methods and procedure to implement- the articles
of the Covenant of ' the League of Rations*;- ^ particularly with.
regard to article "19* ' On the other hand* no question of 
revision cOuld,be releed except in .accordance with article .19«39
Germany.sharply protested to France for her unilateral 
interpretation of the' pact; and at the. name^time* lodged her 
protest in Rome;. She re fused to sign the pact unless France 
formally clárifio.d the situation*^ In her opinion article 
III of the pact had become useless after the June 1 "hitch” 
and now the French "guarantee protocol" would render article 
II m e a n i n g l e s s G e r m a n y  informed Italy that she had to 
protest as inadmissible "the twin fact that France is com* 
mitting' herself contractually with respect-to a third power 
to certain Interpretations' of the Four Power Pact and that 
she is* in addition# pledging herself in advance tip this
-^French Blue Book* 23-3O. See aiso Documents on German 
Foreign Policy« Í9l8-Íl5¿ C¿ I, 5^9*50*' ,
^Documents on German Foreign Policy. 19l6-ii-5. G. I* 555«
^ I b l d ..« 558. '
power, to take such or süch a stand with respect to the 
tracting parties in pursuance of the Four Power Pact
On June 13* Mussolini proposed that German objections 
to the French declaration could be solved by (a) a press 
communique, (b) à speech by Mussolini or (ô):. by Mussolini 
issuing an "instruction" to Von Hassell* which could be pub*
lished after the signature of,the pact,• But 'Germàhy rejected
' ■' : ■; , 1,0
the. Italian proposals* J <
The German protest was rejected by Prance on June 15♦
Frahue1 asserted that she "had committed herself With respect 
to the Little Entente an4 Poland only in one point, namely*■
that a change in the territorial status i * >, must bej£made, 
only’with the consent of the Country to whose disadvantage 
. the change was undertaken*" This French interpretationr - 1 „ . • *.
agreed with the British interpretation of article II and it 
was felt that phe value of article ll was not lost thereby
as Germany seemed to t hlrik* Paul-Bone bur pointed out that
article 19 of the Covenant could be treated with great elas* 
ticity but first it was necessary, considering the present 
political,situation "to make the countries interested in the
fate of Europe and public opinion used to the conversations
lift
^ Documents on German Foreign Policy* ^ I9l8*Jt5i C* I* 550*. 
^3Ibld„* 561.
based ,oh thé Four-Bower Pact by making the subject of dis­
cussions fop the tim© being only economic questions and 
problems 'which hámpef* intercourse between neighboring coun* 
tries and solving them satisfactorily*
Italogerman negotiations were continued In sn effort 
to find a solution tó German.objections* It was finally 
decided-that a ”note verbale” should be issued to the British 
ánd French ambassadors1 In Rome, in which the Italian govern­
ment would specify German complaints* The contents of the 
"note verbale” were worked out between Rome and Berlin* 
Finally .on thily''7 f the ’’note verbale” was issued- in Rpme*^ 
Its contents gave full effect to German objections to the 
French ’’guarantee protocol,” ■
- Note ? Verbale -
The German Government thought it discerned In 
the references contained in these documents ^ g u a r ­
antee protocol*7 to the interpretation of article 
19 of the Covenant and the Pact a procedure which 
Is not calculated to serve the purpose of the Fact*, 
and has addressed to the Italian Government.a note 
expressing these fears and stating that the pur­
pose of the Pact can only be achieved if the four 
> Western Powers are firm in their intention to treat 
all questions to which the Pact refers in a spirit 
of sincere cooperation and mutual confidence« It 
expresses the conviction that the questions concern­
ing the interpretation and application 0f the Pact
^ Documents on German Foreign Policy* 1918-14.5» C, I, 569«
___ L * f o r  „It alo-German negotiations,regar ding the
"note verbale" see P* 559-60p 577« ’
can be settled only by mutual agreement and not 
unilaterally by on© of thé four signatory Govern# 
ments» The Italian Government# referring to the 
oommun'ication made by the French Government at- the' 
time, (May SG)* replied to the German Government • .
to the effect that the only obligation which the 
French Government had assumed toward the Rumanian* 
Czechoslovakian, Yugoslavian* and Polish Govern­
ments was to remain faithful to the principle' df 
unanimity in connection with thé application' of 
article 19 of the League of Nations Covenant to. 
'territorial questions* .and'that therefore the •
^Xtaiian- GoveriOTenfe^i^nsidQred:. the • fearái*ó'f:S' h^e 
German: Government unfounded«. On the Other hand, : 
the Italian Government Is of the opinion (and also 
so Informed the German Government) that/if7 such 
: differences of opinion,regarding.the interpretation 
■ of the Four Power Pact appear, it is in accordance 
, with its spirit that their solution should.be 
sought at meetings of the four Powers **4"
- » *
Germany was satisfied with the procedure adopted by Rome 
to give full expression to her objections, Britain and 
France accepted the note without having to make any reply 
The Pact discussions were now complete* and the four Powers 
signed the pact on July l£>*. •
After prolonged negotiations, lasting for about four 
months, the Four-*Power Pact had become a; reality* But, the 
fears and Suspicions that were aroused in Europe by the pol­
icies of the Nazis in Germany, weighed heavily in determining 
the final text of the pact * There was indeed a striking dif­
ference between the original Mussolini plan and the final
' ^Documents on German Foreign Policy, 19l8-li^, C, I¿ 6)4.5-
ij.6* 605,: 1 • ' ■ ■ f '
^Ibid«, 6Í45> 6Í4.6 n* 6#
draft of the pact* ' Initoflnal stage it was ess©nfcially an 
innocuous document* Thepoaitive proposals for a Concert 
of Suropoj” revision of treaties and for granting "equality 
Of. rights0- to Germany,' were ¿11 Washed away-.in-.the course of 
negotiations^ What was more interesting* ‘ho^averf .'.i»e,e ‘the 
fact that aFoUr-Power Pact of Understanding and Collabora­
tion had been signed at all«.
The European scene; was Indeed unfavorable for concluding 
a pact of Four*Power cooperation. During Juno and July ten­
sions increased in Europe* The London Economic Conference 
and the worldDisarraament Conference were In a state of 
failure, And German rearmament continued unabated,^® Also* 
Baal activities in Austria and the threat of "Arsehiu^s,■ 
contributed:to a further deterioration of the political 
scenefé- Britain and France proposed taking action against 
Germany through the organs of the Four-Power Pact* Musso­
lini, however^ rejected this-proposal. A n d ’Germany warned 
that any. action ¿gainst her through the Four-Power Pact 
Would mean the destruction of the pact At the same time, 
secret collaboration continued between Bóm® and Berlin*
Hitler and lussolini agreed that the It¿Ío#German "program”
^Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919*39, 2* V, Í4.66* 
^ I b l d ** 350* li31* h32a
• ^ Boeuraents on German For e Iran Policy«¡■;’;19l8-hf:i G, I, 690«
under the pact would be? "no German-French understanding 
directed against Italy” and "no Franco-Italian,
directed against Germany*
It was evident that another "scrap of paper" would not 
contribute to understanding and collaboration among the 
four Powers* A British Foreign ©ffice official had made an 
apt analysis of the proposed pact as early as March 23« 1933a 
Be wrote in a memorandum that the Four-Power Pact Idea was 
a commendable one 3 "Co-operation between the four Great 
Powers represents the realistic, and perhaps in the circum­
stances .the only effective method of dealing with-Europe’s
present problems.. It is for this reason highly desirable 
and worth making sacrifices for*" But he pointed out? "If« 
and as soon as conditions at*© favourable for such co-operation 
it caft be brought about almost automatically without written 
agreement being necessary, If«, on the other hand« conditions
are unfavourable« no agreement will be able to create co­
operation. i .
5>%Documents on German Foreign Policy* 191©*à5* Gf I# 559# 
^^Documents o n .Briti3h Foreign Policy* : 1919-391 2« %$ 100*
CHAPTER V.
THÈ STILLrBÔRH PACT
The plan proposed by.Mussolini in March* 1933* ©ftbodied 
positivé proposais to encourage the process, of European rap* 
procheroéntf It represented a call for positive'action at à 
timé when European statesmen weré inclined to pay empty trib­
ute to the ideals of the League of Nations and of interna- 
tional.conciliation. By raising the crucial questions of 
treaty revision and o f .’'equality of rights” for Germany* it 
offered a challenge to Europe1 to strike at the root-cause of 
her difficulties*/
But the Mussolini plan was doomed to end as a negative 
and worthless documentò: The proposals, contained in it rep­
resented a one-sided approach to the problems of Europe,
.The totalitarian powers expectéd concessions frow France and 
her allies without corresponding changes in. their policies 
which might allay fears and Suspicions in Europe » France* 
suspicious, of 11alO^German designs* refUse'd to relinquish her 
hegemony In Europe unless specific guarantees for her secur­
ity were provided4 ■
• •. 'Thé; -©.»tiré •' plan was thus faced with thé problem of
' , . _ • ' " , .1
¡solving the Franco-German struggle for power in Europe * 
Repeated -attempts had been made since the war to create an 
atmosphere of conciliation that would-rehcoUragé the solu­
tion of this problem# But« arrangements such as Locarno 
proved/iriàdëqu&pep' The Pour-Power Pact of 1933 and the 
Munich Pact of 1938 represent efforts of a similar nature♦
They were destined to meet the same fate as the famed "Locarno 
Spiritf': had met#. ■
European rapprochement could not be created by written 
agreements Unless the Powers concerned were prepared to 
make sacrifices, Mussolini and Hitler had the common fàsclst 
policy of twill to power*’ Under the cloak of a pact for 
peace they hoped to break up the system created by the peace 
treaties and avenge the disgrace of Versailles#
Britain's support of the pact represents a move in the 
direction of the subsequent policy of appeasement » At the 
same time Mussolini’s professions on behalf of European 
pehce fell on willing British ears# ^
French support of the pact was mainly due to the weak­
ness of French foreign policy* and its subordination to the 
British policy# Tho support given by the two democracies 
was/ however « lukewarm# Their signature to the pact whs 
secUrèd only at the cost of voiding the pact of all real
meaning* The final platitudinous, text contained no more 
than had been embodied in many previous treaties# in the 
Covenant itself for that matter* It was indeed no accident 
that the framework of the League was repeatedly referred to-- 
"The assertion may seem superfluous; what it actually: meant 
was the denial Of the attempt to set up, a four power director-- 
ate of Europe *,'# * * The League idea had thus triumphed, 
in this test of strength*. All that remained was a warning 
that the League idea had been challenged*
Through prolonged negotiations, conducted in the midst 
of rising tensions, the original Mussolini proposals were 
diluted to a point where nothing but a miraculous sense of 
cooperation among the four Powers could make the plan effect 
tive*, Such cooperation never developed during the 1930*3*
The Four-Power Pact,, consequently, never became effective*
It was sighed on (luly but nò FourrPower conversation® 
were ever held in accordance with the pact.» And finally, 
it was not ratified by the, British or the French Parliaments*. 
Toynbee correctly concluded:
' For this lint ©ward outcome of his original, 
iniativé. Signor Mussolini was doubtless himself 
partly to blame* in so far as certain specific and 
.controversial Italian national aims were bound up 
in his original scheme ias his critics promptly ,
.^Albrecht*Carrie, "Four Power Pacts : 1933-k5j>” Journal
of Central European Affairs* V, Aprili P * 2ij.*
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pointed out ) with a public-spirited attempt, to î " 
salve.the wounds afflicted by the territorial terms 
of thé Peace Treaties and ¡to prevent a fresh out*- 
break ,of unregulated compatitioninhrmaments*, But 
if Signor Musaolini’a opponents hâd/triùmphàntly 
exposed and frustrated the! self ^regarding part of 
his policy,;' they had done ^nothing whatever* on 
their side to solve the two grave and urgent prob­
lems of common interest disarmament and Treaty 
revisipr£7 which Signor Mussolini had in part beer! 
attempting to grapple with.. And before the cldse 
of the calendar year thèse! faults of European states­
manship^-calculât ed self--sleeking on: one side and 
blind unconstructiveness on the other— inexorably 
produced their bitter ■fruijts«,2
Perhaps* if the European Situation: had not steadily 
worsened* the Four ■»•Power Pact would not have remained still­
born*. Its successful application could have created a spirit 
of conciliation similar to the; one that emerged at Locarno in 
1925# At least* such is the impression created by the reac­
tions that followed the adoption of the final text of thé
pact* ,
In Italy popular bplnion hailed' the pact in phrases like : 
"The true peace w$s not signed in 1919 at the end of hostil­
ities, but was signed yesterday in Rome;'* "The pact is for 
ten.years, according to the Ietterò but in substance may prove 
perennial*-'^
^Toynbee (ed*), Survey of International Affairs4 1933»
3«The Times (London) , p *. 12*
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The American ambassador in Rome reported# after the 
sighing of* the pact oh July-’ 15# that the general impression 
prêyailëd that thé pact meant ”the salvation, pf Europe at 
a critical period in its history#” He wrote that the sigh* 
ing of the pact at, a time "when the World Économie^. Cohfer- 
enCe ^as/hreaking up, when the Disarmament Conference /was7 
in the doldrumsj> and when the prestige of the League of 
Nations /was^ at' a low ebbi" had a salutary influence in 
Italy# In fact ^Italian public opinion ^ a j ^  inclined to 
regard the Pour Power Pact as the only worthwhile machinery 
in existence , for international collaboration*
Mùssólinli' topi hailed the pact as a * significant impetus 
to the spirit of collaboration* He dismissed opposition to 
the pact as merely sentimental reaction* Speaking before the 
Italian Seriates he declared that it was. the spirit of the 
Four-Power Pact "which will write »finis * to the chapter Of 
European history since the war and will begin another chapter 
It is the spirit which will guarantee ten years of peace to 
Europe during which the dangerous and complex problems of 
interhal and international peace can bè solved*"^
^Foreign Relations of the United Stateds 1933» I* 1*25 *
^Wheeler-Benhett# Documents on International. Affairs* ' 
1933# 276*77# " ".;
' . . no
\ .l^anCe* -too* was "©xeeedingly; well satisfied" with the 
final version of the pact, Her wishes had been taken into
.'t'f ‘ . " • '
! “ account almost without .exception in the negotiations,- thè,.
final dráft was regarded as a ■.:<tFrench.yict.ory*:n^  France had 
i! recoiled Useful ”moral and spiritual” cooperation from Britain
i'-; ’ ' , "■ ■' • ' . , . . . . . ■ .
W  and her fear of German rearmament was allayed because the
j:?;? -, ; .. ' '
W final, textf. unlike the first draft*, no longer provided any
7\ - ” ‘ -*V , ’• * , • ’• ' •.
juridical basia, for German rearmament*7 Daladier won another 
vote of confidence In Parliament over the< Four-Péwër Pact on 
June 9*
France regarded the pact valuable as ah instrument for 
Franco^Itallan rapprochement ». Mussolini had emphasised his
* ¡ Û
desire for such understanding to de; Jpuvenel * As an expres­
sion of this policy Professor M* Eydoux9 who had been sen«- 
teheed for espionage* was pardoned In Rome on June 7¿ This 
friendly/.gesture had, salutary influence in France^
. Germany was dissatisfied with the contents of the finai; ;. 
draft.,,. She* however* .regarded her ¿ccéptand©" thereof as a . .
. ^ ócumdhtp: on German Foreign Policy*. 1918 *!<■!>* . C8 I* Slhi 
■' 7Xbid,*. 55U* :- 
■ ; 8Ibld^  576*
^Wheeler-Bennettj Documents on internátiohal Affairs*
• 1933* 239 o*2* " . ' V
wise move politically* Foreign Minister Vbh Neurath gave 
full expression tò the Germán reactions?
The, four power pact in the version now decided 
upon certainly does not fulfill by far all the ' 
wishes that we had harbored in connection with the" 
Signific.ánt’ initiative of Mussolini* The counter^ 
action of French group and England's lihce!warmi''iátti¿ 
tude led to á strong dilution of the ideas of the . /• 
originai Italian draft* Nevertheless the pact rép* 
resents political progress -even in its present form* 
Although the-French have succeeded on the. one hand 
in- placing the functions of the pact within the ■
: framework of the League of Nations# nevertheless 
the four Astern Powers were left wi th- haVing as sign­
ed to them the de facto role Of political leadership 
in Europe*.. In this way a new form and a new point 
of departure for the treatment of politicál problems 
have been established*
E'dru important for us than the content - of the 
treaty itself* however* Is, the fact that.a, general 
political treaty of this, kind is now being concluded 
at alii It disavows all attempts at isolating Ger­
many and gives expression to the idea that Germany 
can be* not an object, but only the participating 
subject of European policy* This observâtipn is all 
the more important since we know that the hostility 
to the pact in France and her satellite states is 
mainly to be attributed to the feeling that such a 
pact must necessarily increase the prestige of the 
Reich Government*
By our agréeraient wé gave another striking 
proof of our policy of peace ánd therewith deprived . 
France of any pretext for further postponement of 
effective disarmament. Naturally* Germany1s rela­
tion to other European and extrá-EUropeán PoWors is 
not affected by the pact* Germanjy's freedom of 
action toward all third powers and with regard to 
the problems to be settled with these powers has 
been fully retained*10
^ Documents on German Foreign Policy, 19l8-4t.fi» C> I|.
Britain,regarded the initialling of the pact before the 
London Economic Conference was convened as nah important 
achievement» èven if it was not • ' * • an event of firsts 
class significance* In her opinion the main substance 
of the agreement lay only In its first article» otherwise 
the'pact ^woùld bp a useful piece of machinery to operate 
•within the ambit of the Covenant and in fulfilment of its 
o b j e c t B r i t i s h  attitude was well expressed in a 'dis­
patch » by. Sir John Simon? ‘ "HisMajesty's Government's , 
adherence to thè new agreement does not imply any extension 
of the'obligations of the United Kingdom in European affairs » 
Ihe. British Foreign Secretary clarified this point as fol­
lows: / ■. ■ ;v - ■" ; ' >• .■
We have already assumed the obligations of the,
. Còvèhant» eUid we have assumed1 thé obligations of the 
Pact of Locarno» The Obligations which Britain has 
entered into we shall strive to perform» but our 
friends on the continent well understand » » », that 
it is no part of - the policy of Great' Britain to 
assume ' furthér and additional obligatipiis of this 
' Character * -We\ take our exist ing responsibili ties 
too seriously to be willing, in a light-hearted and 
speculative fashion to enlarge them*^
In. the Little Entente countries the final text of the 
Four-Power Pact did not arouse reactions such as were aroused
^Documents on British Foreign Policy» 1919-39» 2» V» 373*
12Ibid*» 373* ' ■ ’ .
^ Ibld^i 32di
by Mussolini’s draft* However*. the tittle Entente
countries continued to maintain their solid opposition to 
any frontier revision Imposed by, the, four Powers»' In Yugo­
slavia* especially, such opposition was. strong. The German
ambassador ;in Belgrade reported on «June 30: "It is being
stated j^n Yugoslav circle^? that in case the Great Powers' 
should attempt to force Yugoslavia to cede part of her ter­
ritory' to Hungary or Bulgaria* the Government would reply : 
to^sueh pressure by rallitarlisation:, '
The.CzeCh governmentt on the other hand, adopted a more 
conciliatory attitude.* It Reconciled itself to the possi­
bility of meeting certain territorial claims against'her by
Hungary, ^ Dr, Banes suggests such an attitude in his 
memoirs: "Whatever du:r position about' the course, of this'
struggle for the revision of the peace treaties, in à cer- 
tain sense it was.a normal development,; U
> Poland continued to maintain a stubborn anti-pact atti­
tude i PrenCh assurances failed to pacify hep bitter resent­
ment at being,excluded from a "Big-rPower ". pact of collabora­
tion;*; Foré ighlMinls^ Beck insisted that "the. pact would
^ •Documents on German Foreign Policy» 191&lli5¥ C, I* 617, 
•; -^ ibid»» 5k9* : ; v.V'>
,i0Èr*, Eduard Banes, Memoirs» (Godfrey Lias; Tr>)* (London*
mean the hegemony of four Powers or rather of threej as 
France would always find herself In a minority* and: the 
destruction of the heague of Nations*”1? ,
Since the Four*P owe r Pact never came into effect* what*
ever beneficial results it might have brought about cannot 
be correctly ascertained* For* despite Mussolinifs clever 
•manipulation of the strong désires making for peace and 
conciliation in western Europe* the course of ©vents in Nazi 
Germany overrode these considérations by;intensifying the 
French sense of insecurity« The Francp-German ‘struggle for 
power in Europe* ..consequently, .assumed àëw proportions« The. 
status-quo symbolized by the league of Nations, received 
renewed suPP^t of P’rance and her alliés* The Mussolini, plan 
came to be regarded as an instrument for promoting the rèvi- 
slonistic aspirations of the totalitarian Powers*;;
17Documents on Britiah Foreign Policy, 1919-39, 2, V* 334«
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